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Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did
not exalt order at the cost of liberty.

-BADiJ.TI

~R

ARE

mANY

FANCIFUL

WAYS of suggesting the accomplish-

ment of the impossible, as making bricks without straw, or putting on Hamlet without the melancholy Dane, or making an
omelet without any eggs.
The trouble with those phrases is their familiarity; they have become
cliches. And so anyone interested in the expansion of the English language
may note with pleasure that at the October 1950 term of the Supreme
Court, that body gave us another handy phrase to add to this growing
lexicon. It had a Civil Liberties term of Court-without any Liberty.
Hyperbole? Perhaps there was one egg in that omelet, a little straw for
the bricks. The Prince may at least have been the off-stage noises in the
legendary performance. So with Liberty at mid-Century: she was only an
off-stage rumble, not a character dominating the scene.
In 1950-51, civil rights cases were by far the most important on the
* This article is the fifth in an annual series. While the general structure of the article has
been the same throughout the five year period, experience has led to some modifications of its
purposes, and these may now be said to be three: (a) to present a concise summary of the most
interesting of the cases; (b) to comment briefly on their apparent general social significance;
and (c) to make some record of factors observed concerning the institutional function of the
Court. Shot through each purpose is that sense of personal relief which an author gets from
expressing his own views as to the proper decision of the cases. The preceding articles are,
1946 Term, z5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i (1947); 1947 Term, i6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i (1948); 1948
Term, 17 Univ. Chi.L. Rev. i ('949); 1949 Term, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i (ig5o). Theywill be
cited by the date of the Term, as 1946 Term article.

t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
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docket. Quantitatively it was a small term, with only 88 cases decided by
opinion, fewer than in any year for a century., But if the measure be
significance of the cases decided, it was a substantial term, with more
broadly meaningful decisions than in many years.
I. HIGH SPOTS OF THE YEAR,
The civil rights cases were most, but not all, of the major business of
the term. Within ten days of the decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
DistillersCorp., invalidating provisions in state "fair trade" acts binding
non-signing dealers to the terms of price-fixing contracts between producers and other distributors, so-called "fair trade" prices began to collapse; 'where the Supreme Court had pointed toward lower prices, Macy's
and Gimbel's quickly went. "Color TV" should be a reality before the end
of the next term of Court under a decision upholding a Federal Communications Commission order, a matter of more general interest than legal
significance.3 The practice of seizing industrial plants in emergencies will
be materially affected by the first contemporary decision concerning the
4
cost of such seizures to the government.
The civil rights cases were: The Blau cases,5 precluding questions of
Communist affiliation before grand juries on the ground of self-incrimination (although by the slightest misstep, the witness may waive this right) ;6
Feinerv. New York 7 the first holding in Supreme Court history ever to
permit the punishing of a public speaker for the astonishing reason that
one member of the audience was annoyed into threats of violence by what
the speaker said; and Collins v. Hardyman' which so narrowly construed
one section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as to eliminate it. These were
but the curtain raisers for three outstanding holdings: Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,9 holding that the Attorney General must
make at least some tiny revelation of why he puts organizations on his
subversive list; the Bailey v. Richardsono and Garner v. Board of Public
Works of Los Angeles" cases respectively, upheld the national loyalty proThe method of counting cases is described in part V infra.
2341 U.S. 384 (1951).

'Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (ig5i). (As of October i951, it
was apparent that war shortages would delay this development.)
4United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (195i).
s Blau (Patricia) v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (i95o); Blau (Irving) v. United States,
340 U.S. 332 (X951).
6 But

cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (195i).

7340

U.S. 3J5 (95i).

8341 U.S. 651 (i95i).

9 341 U.S.

123

(1951).

10"341 U.S. 918 (i95i).

11,341 U.S. 706 (i95i).
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gram, and a loyalty oath in Los Angeles; and Dennisv. United States," the
most important "free speech" decision since Holmes and Brandeis began
their apparently fruitless task of finding meaning in the First Amendment.
II. R EGULTION O LABOR AND BusmNEss
LABOR

By 1951, the Taft-Hartley Act13 had been in operation long enough to
have carried a full load of problems to the Supreme Court, and almost
every important labor case of the year arose from that Act. To this there
was one exception, for the most important labor case of the year seemed,
at a glance, neither important nor a labor case; but the consequences of
United States v. Pewee Coal Co.' 4 may well outweigh any of the other decisions of the year.
In the Pewee case, the Court for the first time since the post-World War
I era took a serious look at some of the economic consequences of plant
seizures by the government in periods of emergency. The device of government intervention in labor disputes by "seizure" became familiar to the
point of routine in World War II,'5 and almost every case has consisted of
a completely nominal government "taking" followed by establishment of
government-set labor conditions.-6 Actual management has usually remained exactly where it was before. While in rare instances the "seizure"
has been for some purpose other than that of achieving satisfactory labor
relations,' 7 the seizure sanction has been primarily a device for government settlement of labor disputes.
When the government "seizes" (and the quotes will be abandoned here12

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (I95I).

"3Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. x36 (r947), 29 U.S.C.A. §
1go).
X434I

141 (Supp.,

U.S. r14 (I95I).

ISThe general problem of the source and nature of the Government's power to take private
property in wartime and the extent of its liability for such takings is discussed in: Expropriation of Property for National Defense, Lands Div., Dep't Justice (194o), particularly pp. 8494; Marcus, The Taking and Destruction of Property Under a Defense and War Program,
27

Corn. L.Q. 317 (1942); American Economic Mobilization, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 5o6 (1942);

Executive Commandeering of Strike-Bound Plants, 51 Yale L.J. 282, 289-90 (1941).
6
x 1 was extensively involved in plant seizure cases during World War II. In the second
Montgomery Ward seizure, the taking by the War Department was a real military operation,
involving an actual possession run with stop-watch precision. But in another taking of the
same period, only one government employee ever came within a hundred miles of the seized
property.
Z7See,

e.g., the episode involved in Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748 (Ct. Cl.,

195o) cert. denied 339 U.S. 956 (195o), a seizure for excess profit-taking.
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after) a plant, it is exercising the eminent domain power" and is subject
to Fifth Amendment requirements that it make just compensation. 9
Hence one of the most troublesome problems of seizure is, How shall the
government be charged for what it has taken? What is just compensation
for the temporary taking of a plant, the alteration of some detail of its
labor relations, and the eventual return of it?
Two general observations suggest the underlying problems:
i. A decision as to the means of calculating just compensation may
enormously affect labor relations: if the compensation is high enough to
be attractive to the employer, he will be in no hurry to comply with government "suggestions" as to his labor policy, and the government may
pay heavily for the privilege of settling the labor dispute. If the compensation is unattractive to the employer, the government will have a tremendously strong hand with which to compel his acquiescence in its proposals.
2. One possible method of calculating just compensation would be
simple quitclaim. The taking would be recognized as nominal, and the
government would "release" the property on condition that the owner
release the government from all claims. Profits and losses for the period of
seizure would be the owner's since, except for the change in his labor policy,
usually on a point fairly minor in the whole profit and loss structure, he
was unaffected by the seizure. This quitclaim device is obviously not the
only way out of the financial situation created by seizure, but it is the only
one which gives the owner neither a premium nor a penalty for having
been seized. It is the device which, by informal negotiation rather than by
court decision, has actually been used for the past ten years.
The Pewee case swept the quitclaim system into discard.
There was a considerable range of possible solutions which the Court
might have chosen. It might conceivably, though either of these possibilities is unlikely, have held that the taking for this purpose is non-compensable;20 or it might have held it not a "taking" at all, but a form of

1s The government has argued that the President possesses this power as an aspect of the
war power even without authorizing legislation: "There is an executive power to take property
in time of emergency. [This is] a power in the nature of eminent domain." Brief for the United
States at 33, United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 15o F. 2d 369 (C.A. 7th, 1945).
'9 Applications of the compensation requirement as to war-time takings in other areas are
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (i93I); Int'l Paper Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 399 (i93I); and see dicta in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81,
88 (I92i), as developed in United States v. McFarland, 15 F. 2d 823, 826 (C.A. 4th, 1926).
20 Cf. United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887), holding the government not liable

for destruction of bridges in actual combat, and quoting a veto message of President Grant as
to the non-compensability of property "temporarily occupied, or even actually destroyed" in
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"regulation. '2 It might have held that the seizure is a taking, but that the
control is so nominal as to put no liability on the government. 22 Or it
might have required "just and fair" compensation, but calculated it as the
actual operating return.2 3 It did none of these things.
The Pewee Coal Co. was one of the concerns whose property was taken
and operated by the government in the course of the 1943 coal strike. The
lower court found a $2,241 operating loss attributable to the government's
operation, and gave judgment for that amount to Pewee.24 All nine Justices agreed that this was a "taking" for Fifth Amendment purposes, but
they split widely on compensation. Justice Black, for three other Justices,
enunciated the following land-mark propositions in the course of affirming
the judgment:
Like any private person or corporation, the United States normally is entitled to the
profitsfrom, and must bear the losses of, business operations which it conducts....
Where losses resulting from operation of property taken must be borne by the Government, it makes no difference that the losses are caused in whole or in part by compliance
with administrative regulations requiring additional wages to be paid.... Whatever might have been Pewee's losses had it been left free to exercise its own business
judgment, the crucial fact is that the Government chose to intervene by taking
possession and operating control. By doing so, it became the proprietor and, in the absence of contrary arrangements, was entitled to the benefits and subject to the losses
which that status involves.25

Justice Reed, concurring, argued that the government should be liable

only for such losses, in these war-time labor takings, as would result from
major emergencies. In similar vein, see In the Matter of a Petition of Right, [i915]3 K.B. 649,
but for modification of this view and acceptance of the principle of compensation, see Att'y
Gen. v. DeKeyser's Royal Hotel, [192o] A.C. 5o8.
21Cf. Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 188 (1922) and Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393 (1923). Regulation of the labor conditions which is an object of
the taking might have been analogized to rent control, Block v. Hirch, 256 U.S. i35, i56
(1921).

- This is the soundest of the alternatives listed, and is based on direct holdings in Marion &
Rye Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280 (1926); Nevada-California-Oregon Ry. v.
United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 75 (1928). Those cases held that nominal control was non-compensable, and might have been brought to bear here, as justice Burton argued in dissent.
23 A possible analogy is United States v. Sponenbarger, 3o8 U.S. 256 (939), in which the
Court held that a person flooded in a government contrived spillway area resulting from its
Mississippi levee program could claim no compensation; for if there had been no levees, he
would have been flooded anyway. So here: if there had been no taking, the strike losses would
usually far outrun the operating losses.
24 This sum represents the expenditure made in compliance with a War Labor Board directive. Pewee also originally sued for operating losses of $36,128 which were not the product
of government action. This was denied it, and Pewee did not cross appeal.
2SUnited States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 117, 118 (951) (emphasis added).
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the government's own act, in this case the enforcement of a War Labor
Board order; but that it should not be saddled with the operating losses of
businesses which were independently operating at long-term losses, such as
"certain railroads, coal mines, or television broadcasting stations. '

11

6

The

dissenters, in a brief opinion by Justice Burton, held that Pewee was not
harmed at all by the government's acts, and in effect affirmed a faith in the
quitclaim system.
The vital passages of the majority opinion are those tucked in phrases
italicized above: "The United States normally is entitled to the profits
from" and "was entitled to the benefits" of a taking. In this case, true, the
government takes a loss; but normally these emergency war-time takings
occur in inflationary periods in which concerns can scarcely avoid making
money; and while the government may occasionally take a loss, as on a
hopeless railroad, it will usually gain considerably. For an extreme example, if the government had seized General Motors in 1945, it would
have had a claim on the 188 millions in profits made by that concern that
year. Not all of that profit would have gone to the government, even under
the majority view; for under it, the government will have to pay fair compensation for its takings, and "the Government's profit and loss experience may well be one factor involved in computing reasonable compensation for a temporary taking. ' ' 27 But the government will get some of it.
If this four-man view becomes that of a stable majority, the government has gained enormous new power to compel settlements on its own
terms. A prosperous business will be unable to afford the drain on its
profits where the government is "entitled to the benefits" of a taking. The
position of unions is correspondingly improved; for the new control over
employers is not balanced by any new control over labor. Under the old
system, if labor were to threaten a strike in an emergency, the employer
could be essentially indifferent to the results of government intervention
by seizure. Under the new system, the employer should go far to avoid
that result.
The Court's other major labor problems of the year turned on its bewildered attempts to find its way through the incoherencies of the TaftHartley Act. As to two of those problems, the most rational solution is
that Congress had nothing in mind at all; but since courts are not allowed
26 Ibid., at i19.
-

27Leading temporary taking cases are United States v. General Motors Corp.,

323

U.S.

373 (1945); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States, 338 U.S. i (1949).
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to throw in the sponge, they were compelled to construct some path
through the maze.
Brave, at least, was the solution to the 8(b) (4)(A) problem.2' That section makes it an unfair labor practice for any union to engage in concerted
activities of which "an object" is to force "any employer or other person.., to cease doing business with any other person." The one point on
which the Court unanimously agreed was that these words did not mean
what they said, for otherwise substantially all concerted activities would
have been made illegal. That is to say, the object of picketing normally is
to keep non-striking workers, or customers or suppliers or others, from
doing business with an employer, in which case its object is to cause "an
employer.., to cease doing business" with another person.
The legislative history shows that this language was not meant to go
as far as it appears to, but instead was intended to eliminate "secondary
boycotts" only. The rub here is that the legislators appear to have been
against secondary boycotts without having any clear idea of what they
29
were.
The problem came to a head in the building industry, over which the
Board took jurisdiction for the first time after the passage of the TaftHartley Act.3 0 Normally, building is a process of contracting and subcontracting, and most of the work goes to the nineteen building trades
unions of the AFL with their two million members. But occasionally a
prime contractor may let one small part of a job to a non-union subcontractor, and the unions may then refuse to work further on the building. In a group of such cases, the Court, Justice Burton speaking for the
majority, held that such strikes are secondary boycotts, and illegal under
this section.
More was never made to hang on less. The Court is apparently agreed
that if two crafts, one unionized and the other not, are employed by one
contractor, the unionized wing may legitimately strike against work with
their non-union brethren; but if the same crafts do the identical work on
the same job, but under different subcontractors, there may be no strike.
28 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § i58(b)( )(A) (Supp., 195o). The cases are NLRB v.
4
Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (195x); Int'l Bro. Elec. Workers
v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (i951); Local 74 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951); and NLRB v. Int'l
Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (i95i).
9 See NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 673, 674 (1951).
30 The discussion following is influenced by The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the
Building and Construction Industry, 6o Yale L.J. 673 (195), from which the facts of this
paragraph are taken.
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Justice Douglas, dissenting, would have given quite a different interpretation to the concept of secondary boycott. As he commonsensically said:
"All the union asked was that union men not be compelled to work alongside non-union men on the same job."' 3 This is so palpably different from
the traditional objection to the secondary boycott-the objection to at'' tacks on an employer on "a front remote from the immediate dispute 32
that Douglas thought the Act did not reach it.
The decision may materially alter relations in the building industry,
and greatly weaken the unions there. "With employers numerous, employment of short duration, and individual craft units small on any one
project, unions have traditionally been forced to rely on the cooperation of
all workers on a job in order to bring pressure on any particular employer."' 33 In these cases the strike should be regarded realistically as
against the prime contractor who brought the subcontractor onto the job,
not against the independent subcontractor; and to dispose of the matter
as Justice Burton does with the phrase, "[tihe business relationship between independent contractors is too well established in the law to be
overridden without clear language doing so"'3 4 overlooks the fact that the
language used by Congress is so totally inapposite that Justice Burton is
forced entirely to judicial legislation to make any sense of the provision.
If judicial legerdemain can turn a seeming prohibition of strikes generally
into a limitation on "secondary boycotts" only, it ought to be able to
accomplish the next step of giving a rational definition of "secondary
boycott."
The solution of the secondary boycott problem is brave at least in the
sense that it takes firm hold of the problem and does something with it.
The same cannot be said for the (more difficult) question of the scope of
judicial review under the Taft-Hartley Act. The disposition of this question can be described only as a meditative contemplation of a hard question, followed by sweeping the whole troublesome matter out of sight.
The Wagner Act had been read to say that Board orders were to be
enforced by the Courts of Appeal if supported by "substantial evidence."
There has been considerable uncertainty as to what this standard actually
was, but whatever it was, Congress was dissatisfied with it because it, in
Congressional opinion, unduly limited judicial review. After considering a
variety of possibilities, Congress finally wrote into the Taft-Hartley Act a
3' NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
32fDouds v. Metropolitan Federation, 75 F. Supp. 672, 677 (S.D. N.Y., 1948).
33Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act, etc., note 30 supra, at 688.
.4

NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 69o (i95).
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provision that Board orders should be enforced "if supported by substan3S
tial evidence on the record considered as a whole.'
A Court of Appeals, puzzled as to its duties under the old language,
might well be more puzzled under the new. Exactly what is it supposed to
do now that it had not done before? The government contended that the
new language made no difference, that this was simply a new way of stating the former practice. But this does injustice to the urgency with which
Congress made the change. In an objective and thoughtful opinion, Justice Frankfurter did the best that could be done with this phrase which,
by itself, is almost meaningless. He reproved Congress lightly for failing to
speak "with that clarity of purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes
courts in order to enable them to enforce its true will," but he concluded:
"It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood.... As legislation that mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a
standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness
''6
of application. 3
And what is the new mood? The courts shall no longer, if they did so
before, look only to whether there is some evidence to support a Board
order in the record. Instead they should consider the whole record, and
make some weighing of the contrary evidence before approving the order.
Yet courts are not to hear the matter de novo; they should pay due deference to Board expertise. This, says the Court, is concededly imprecise; but
it can not be made more definite. "To find the change so elusive that it can
not be precisely defined does not mean that it may be ignored." In the
last analysis, the Courts of Appeal hereafter should assure "that the
37
Board keeps within reasonable grounds.'
Surely this is a fair attempt to do the best that can be done with the
insoluble. Congress, says the Court, wants judges to be a little stricter
with the Labor Board. This is imprecise, perhaps necessarily so; but judges
must nonetheless now be a little stricter. But the Court did not stop there.
Instead, having found complete uncertainty as to the real meaning of the
"mood," it washed its hands of the problem and declined to give any
decision on concrete facts.
Thus in Universal CameraCorp. v. NLRB,'5 it remanded to the Court of
361 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § z6o(e) (Supp., 1947). The relevant cases and commentators are reviewed in Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole
Record," 64Harv. L. Rev. 1233 (i95i).
36Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,483,487 (195i).
37
3s

Ibid., at 49 o . All this is fully analyzed op. cit. supra note 35.
340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951)•
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Appeals "to grant or deny enforcement as it thinks the principles expressed in this opinion dictate." In the companion case of NLRB v. Pitts39
it made this policy of withdrawal much clearer. There it
burgh S. S. Co.,
held that the Sixth Circuit had caught the new mood, and fairly attempted
to apply it in refusing enforcement of a Board order. It continued: "Were
we called upon to pass on the Board's conclusions in the first instance...
we might well support the Board's conclusions. ' ' 4° The Court thereupon
announced that it would not grant certiorari in Labor Board cases merely
because "on a conscientious consideration of the entire record, a Court of
Appeals under the new dispensation finds the Board's order unsubstantiated."4'
What this means as a practical matter is that at the very point when
some certainty might be introduced into the new language by Supreme
Court interpretation in a few different fact situations, the Court will not
give that certainty. This in turn means that the so-called anti-labor circuits, notably the Fifth and to a lesser extent the Sixth, are to be under no
effective supervision. Only last year, the Court most pointedly rebuked
the Fifth Circuit for flagrantly substituting its views of the facts for those
of the Labor Board 2 Justice Frankfurter then dissented. As the discerning Professor Jaffe points out, though making a different point: "His view
in that respect [i.e. in respect to last year's cases] appears now to have
prevaled."43
Last of the major labor cases is the group invalidating the Wisconsin
Public Utility Strike Law on the ground that it conflicts with the TaftHartley Act. 44 The Wisconsin Act regulates public utility strikes in detail.
A year ago, the Court in Int'l Union, UAW v. O'Brien4s held that the
federal labor act occupies the field of its jurisdiction as to strikes: "None
of these sections can be read as permitting concurrent state regulation of
peaceful strikes for higher wages." 46 It follows a fortiori that the Wisconsin law is invalid unless the O'Brien case is to be reconsidered, and the
Chief Justice for the majority so held. Justice Frankfurter's extraordinarU.S. 498 (I95i).
Ibid., at 502.

39 340

40

Ibid., at 503.
NTLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563 (ig5o); NIL RB v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339
U.S. 577 (i95o); both commented upon in connection with this point in 1949 Term article, 4-5.
41

42

43Jaffe,

op. cit. supra note 31, at

1249.

44 The principal case is Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (195i).
4s339 U.S. 454 (1950), discussed in 1949 Term article, S-6.
46339 U.S. 454, 457 (95o)-
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ily attenuated dissent argues that since Congress set up a system, under
the Taft-Hartley Act, for handling major strike emergencies of a national
character in industries of any sort, it is somehow "impl[ied] that states
retain the power to protect the public interest" as to utilities. 47 To paraphrase in response a comment by that same dissenting Justice in another
situation: "The short answer to the suggestion [that Congressional establishment of a national policy for emergencies means that it meant the
states to be able to deal with utility strikes] is that it is a strange way of
'4
saying it." 8
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE

The Schwegmann case created a sensation. For a time at least it "rolled
back" a greater volume of consumer-good prices than all the regulations
of the Office of Price Stabilization put together; and while, as a bit of
statutory construction, the case was, to put it sedately, novel, no very
objective criticism can fairly be expected from any commentator whose
principal class association is as a member of the high-price-ridden consuming public. For the first time in many years, an agency of government
had done something effective for the poor purchaser, though the period of
relief may be short.
The issue was the interpretation of the Miller-Tydings Act, which exempted from the Sherman Act "contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale" 49 of goods where such agreements are lawful
under state law. Forty-five states now have such so-called "fair trade"
laws which permit a manufacturer to set a minimum price for the resale of
his goods by retailers. Without the Miller-Tydings Act, and the supporting state legislation, such resale price maintenance agreements would be
illegal under the Sherman Act.
There is no argument as to whether the Miller-Tydings Act legalizes
actual agreements between manufacturers and their distributors. But
most of the state laws go further, and make binding on all the retailers of
the state minimum prices set in an agreement which may have been made
between the manufacturer and only one retailer in the state. In other
words, the state laws permit minimum price fixing by the manufacturer
not only as to signers of an agreement, but also as to non-signers.The issue
47

Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383, 407 (1951).

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 ('947). Other labor cases were NLRB v. Gullett
Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (i95i) on the relation of unemployment compensation to back pay
awards; and NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951) on non-Communist
oaths by labor federations.
49

415o Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. § i (i95i).

-
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is whether such state laws are in conflict with the Sherman Act as to the
non-signers.
On the face of the Act, resale price maintenance should be unenforceable as against non-signers. All that is exempted from the Sherman Act in
terms are "contracts and agreements" fixing resale prices, and by definition, the non-signers have no agreements. But the legislative history
handicaps this happy literalism. When the Miller-Tydings Act was passed,
forty-two states had fair trade laws obligatory as to non-signers on their
books. These laws necessarily then only applied to trade so local that the
Sherman Act did not reach it, but Sen. Tydings said that the object of his
bill was "to back up those acts.' 'S° Rep. Dirksen, a member of the Conference Committee, specifically referred to the treatment of non-signers under state acts and said that the object of the federal legislation was to put
"the stamp of approval upon price maintenance transactions under State
acts." The House Committee report on an early stage of the Act specifically referred to the non-signer provisions of the state laws as part of what
it intended to legitimate.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion freed the Act of the incubus of this
legislative history by emphasizing that most of the legislative history was
on forms of the bill which did not pass, and that the form of the bill which
did pass (as a rider on a tax bill) had slightly different wording than the
earlier bills, an argument weakened by the fact that the language changes
had no perceptible relation to the minimum price clauses here in issue.
Once separated from the legislative history, the words were construed
simply as applying only to signers."'
The case was decided on May 21st. On May 28th, Macy's, New York
department store, a perennial non-signer, cut prices 6% on 5,978 items,
and the rush was on.-- Gimbel's met the challenge, and soon prices were
tumbling in every major department store in New York. Klein on the
Square joined the fight with an enormous reduction in the price of Bulova
watches.
These effects must not be exaggerated. A report of the Committee on
the Economic Report says:
soAll legislative history quoted here is taken from the opinions.
s,Particularly intriguing is the concurring opinion of Justices Jackson and Minton which
fundamentally attacks the use of fragmentary and sometimes obscure bits of legislative history
in statutory interpretation.
52N.Y. Times, p. I, col. 3 (May 29, ig5i). For weeks thereafter the price war remained
front page news.
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An investigation indicates that substantial price cutting on fair-traded goods
occurred in only 8 out of the 123 cities surveyed. The principal price cutting was on
electrical household goods, cosmetics, and drug sundries. By the end of July the price
war had almost abated.
There seems to be little likelihood in the immediate future that the court decision
will result in widespread price decreases. Many retailers seem to have taken advantage of the fair trade decisions to stimulate sales and reduce temporarily embarrassing inventories.... This decision may later create problems for many retailers and
manufacturers should inventories again become excessive and consumer demand sharply decline.S3

But this is only to say that the decision is no substitute for an inflation

control program. It may still be of considerable consequence, as the Department of Justice has indicated an intent to prosecute manufacturers
who refuse to sell to non-signers.
The principal other trade regulation statutory interpretation case, in
which the Court analyzed legislative history with an enthusiasm for its
details which belied the disbelief some of them were to express in that
4
source in the Schwegmann case, is Standard Oil Co. v. FTC.5
The issue was whether good faith in meeting price competition is an
absolute defense to a charge of price discrimination under Section 2 of the
Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.55 Standard unquestionably was giving four large Detroit gas jobbers more favorable
prices than their competitors received, favors not justified by any factors
peculiar to the cost or quantity of the particular sales. The four jobbers
either retailed the gas themselves or sold it to customer stations in a
fashion clearly prejudicial to those dealers not receiving the favored price.
So much was conceded on all sides.
Prior to the Robinson-Patman Act, discriminatory price cuts to meet
competition were permitted under the Clayton Act. The Robinson-Patman Act amended this Clayton Act provision to provide that a showing of
price discrimination made a "prima facie case" of conduct which would
have the proscribed effect, namely to "substantially lessen competition,"
but that a seller might "rebut" this prima facie case by showing that the
lower price was "in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor." In other words, only that price discrimination which "lessens competition" is illegal, and a seller may rebut the prima facie case of illegality
53 Sen.

Rep. No. 644, 82d Cong. ist Sess. 13 (ig5i).
U.S. 231 (1951). See Price Discrimination in Gasoline Marketing: The Detroit Jobbers Case, i9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 58 (I95i).
54340

ss 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. § is(b) (195).
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which actual discrimination makes by showing that the discrimination was
6
intended to meet existing competition.1
The exact question then becomes the effect of rebutting a prima facie
case. The majority, through Justice Burton, held that the rebuttal of a
prima facie case amounts to a complete defense, so that the law in this
respect is left exactly as it was before the Robinson-Patman Act was
passed. The minority, in a tightly reasoned and fully documented opinion
by Justice Reed, contended that while proof was not overwhelming, it was
unlikely that Congress had made the change without meaning to make a
difference; and therefore the FTC was free to find, as it did here, that even
though the price discriminations were for the purpose of meeting competition, they still had the illegal effect of lessening competition.
There is no basis for speculation on practical economic effects of the
decision. The most likely effect is that it will very slightly increase the expansion of those large enterprises which are able to play suppliers off
37
against each other.
But the decision is of consequence only if one assumes that the trade
regulatory laws are of consequence in economic life, and this in turn depends on the remedies that attach to those laws. To declare conduct wrong
is one thing, to do something about it quite something else again. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has been -moderately "tough" on substantive
trade regulation law, but "soft" on remedies s8 So it was again this year.
The big remedy case was Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States.5 9
A majority of the Court found that American Timken had conspired with
British and French Timken, respectively, to eliminate world competition.
After dealing with the difficult questions of the merits, the Court reached
the remedy. Justices Black, Douglas, and Minton believed that the solus6This subject is comprehensively considered in Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition,
and Confusion, 6o Yale L. J. 929 (195x), drawn heavily upon here. See also Adelman, Integration and the Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 60-74 (1949).
57Mr. Thomas Austern finds that the decision "contributed only new uncertainties." The
decision permits discriminatory prices only to meet competition, yet "[i]f one seller inquires
too intimately into the pricing operations of another, the shadow of the Sherman Act may
soon enshroud both of them." Again, "if the Indiana opinion means what it appears to say,
and a lower competitive price may be met only if the seller is assured that it is not in violation
of the Act, some doubt may exist as to whether the defense which that decision recognizes is
not somewhat hollow." Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, 1951 CCH Antitrust Symposium,
158, 66-68 (ig5').
In Rowe, op. cit. supra note 52,the belief is stated that the Court would not, as it did, have
"sought to accomplish fundamental change" unless it was prepared to stand on what it had
done, and continues: "Packing the substantive meeting competition defense with pitfalls for
the seller would clearly rob the decision of significance." It develops the theories on which the
defense may become of real value to sellers.
ssA theme developed briefly in 1947 Term article, io et seq.
s 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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tion was to require American Timken to divest itself of its interests in the
British and French companies: "[T]he most effective way to suppress
further Sherman Act violations is to end the intercorporate relationship
which has been the core of the conspiracy."10
But on this point the views, not of Justice Black who delivered the
opinion of the Court, but of the concurring Justice Reed prevailed. Justice
Reed chose the occasion to release some general strictures, which will
have the most far reaching consequences, against the remedy of divestiture. He spoke of it as a "harsh remedy," and one "not to be used indiscriminately." It should not be used where "other effective remedies, less
harsh, are available." What then is the preferred remedy? "The injunction
is a far stronger sanction against further violation than the Sherman Act
alone," a conclusion evidenced by the "paucity of cases dealing with contempt of Sherman Act injunctions." The injunction "leaves power in the
court to enforce divestiture, if the injunction alone fails. Prompt and full
complicance with the decree should be anticipated."6 '
This general attitude, which will dominate the lower courts hereafter,
probably spells an end to frequent attempts to use the divestiture remedy
in any case except that of major monopolies. This is an important developrment, for, with criminal sanctions too small to be consequential, a corporation can commit almost any practices (short of complete monopolization)
with confidence that the most it can suffer is to be told by injunction to
stop.62 Is not such a command too little and too late to make any difference to Timken?
In the related field of patents, two gadget cases attracted a disproportionate amount of attention. In one, the issue was the validity of a patent
on a cashier's counter rack used by A. & P. grocery stores to move groceries from the end of a counter to a position in front of the cashier. 63 The
device consists of a three-sided frame without top or bottom, kept on the
counter by guides. When in position at the end of the counter, it permits
the customer to unload his groceries into the frame which can then be
pulled forward in front of the cashier for checking. That the device is
useful is not doubted; that it ranks with the invention of, say, the telegraph, no one believes.
6o Ibid., at 6oo.
61Ibid., at 6oz-6o 5.
62See, e.g., the famous Hartford-Empire memorandum, including the passage: "I... do
not see much danger of having any of these deals upset.... If they are upset, I still believe

that by that time, we will be in a better position even with such dissolution than we would
be otherwise; and I see no danger whatsoever of any criminal liability...
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 437, 438 (i945).

."

Hartford-Empire

6s Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
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The Court recognized that the rack is a good idea, "but scores of progressive ideas in business are not patentable," and neither is this one.
Justice Douglas, concurring, seized the opportunity to spank the Patent
Office for issuing ridiculous patents: "The patent involved in the present
case belongs to this list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has
spawned. The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has
to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid dramatically
illustrates how far our patent system frequently departs from the con'64
stitutional standards which are supposed to govern.
Later in the term the Court disposed of an even sillier patent by reversing without opinion a Seventh Circuit decision which had upheld a patent
on a most deceptive toy pig. The pig, which perched in most unlikely
fashion on the edge of a child's breakfast bowl, its tail buried in cereal,
could be given each alternate spoonful of cereal ("See, Junior, piggy takes
a spoonful, too"), which it then deposited through its tail back in the
bowl.6 s
These reversals, and particularly the Douglas concurrence, called forth
the wrath of the patent bar faithful. Several writers took the position that
gadget patents were affirmatively desirable and that the standard of invention should not be set so high as to preclude them. An historical argument was advanced that as of 1787, gadget patents were the norm, the
convenient oddities in Thomas Jefferson's bedroom at Monticello being
pointed to as examples.66 That the Patent Office would continue to go its
Supreme Court-ignoring, gadget-granting way was hinted in a Journal of
the Patent Office Society article: "What effect this admonition will have
' '6
on the Patent Office remains to be seen. 7
Ibid., at 153, 158.
s Trager v. Crest Specialty, 184 F. 2d 577 (ig5o), rev'd without opinion, 341 U.S. 912
ig5i). The article of the alleged infringer was slightly different-his toy was a puppy instead
of a pig.
66As it is put by Gregg, Some New Patent Cases, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 6ox, 607 (ig5i), the A. &
P. "case had, for friends of the patent system, somewhat the effect and shock of a cold shower
after the warm and relaxing bath" of decisions of the year before. Examples of the historical
argument are Siggers, Comments on Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 33 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 83
(i951), giving Jefferson's bed as an example of a sound patent; Holbrook, Science v. Gadgets,
33 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 87 (i95i).
6
7 Brodoer, Gadget Patents, 33 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 102, 103 (195i). For several pages supporting the conclusion that "the Patent Office takes virtually every possible attitude about their
consistent rebukes from the courts except one: nowhere does one find evidence of a resolution
to conform to the statutes as interpreted by the judiciary. The attitude, rather, is that the
courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, are The Enemy, to be thwarted by every ingenuity of which the Office is capable," see i938 Term article, 19-24.
64

6
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OTHER PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS

a) Color TV
The color TV case,"8 though of no particular legal difficulty or significance, was of major public concern because of the great interest in everything respecting television. At issue was the validity of an order of the
Federal Communications Commission setting standards for the transmission of color television. The Commission had selected the CBS system, and
rejected the RCA system. Since all conceded the Commission's power to
make orders on this subject, the only serious question was whether the
particular order was arbitrary and capricious.
Enormous briefs (225 pages for RCA, 15o for the government and
CBS) discussed the technicalities of the order and the details of the system, their flicker, brightness, color fidelity, picture texture, and susceptibility to interference. But the mass of details only made more obvious the
difficulty of the issues before the FCC, and the impossibility of terming
their resolution capricious. Hence Justice Black, in an opinion unanimous
but for Justice Frankfurter, in a few words upheld the Commission.
The principal effect of the decision is to give a go-ahead signal to CBStype color, which in turn requires the viewer to buy an adjusting device.
Two small boys in New Jersey immediately announced that they had
made one for less than a dollar. By summer's end, industry opposition to
the CBS system appeared to be declining, as beginning experimental
broadcasts had been made. Attention turned to such wonders of the new
medium as the lady who had been pictured eight times a day holding an
apple during the experimental process19
b) Transportation
A miscellany of cases have very little in common except that they all
involve transportation of goods.
Five were cases of state or local regulation challenged under the commerce or import-export clauses. Two opinions by Justice Clark represent
conscientious efforts to make as explicit as possible the factors which limit
and permit state controls. In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas
68Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (ig5i). See "Public Interest!'
and the Market in Color Television Regulation, i8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 802 (195i).
69"Patty Painter, a twenty-two-year-old, five-foot-one-inch, ninety-five-pound, hazeleyed, ash-blond young woman whose complexion is pure cream and whose lips are a bright
ruby red, is one of the unsung pioneers of C.B.S. color television. To Miss Painter has fallen
the historic task of just standing or sitting around-eight hours a day for the past five yearsin front of C.B.S. experimental color cameras ...." New Yorker, p. 20 (Aug. ii,ig5i).
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the issue was the power of the state to set prices on gas produced

within its borders and sold interstate. The validity of such state price
regulation, said Clark, depends on three tests: "that the regulation not
discriminate against or place an embargo on interstate commerce, that it
safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local interest at stake
outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the prevention of
state restrictions.' 17 He then squarely faced each of these questions on the
facts of this case, deciding each in favor of the state.
Of particular significance in the Cities Service case was the emphasis on
the non-discriminatory nature of the price regulation, and the restatement
of the 194 9 decision of H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond72 solely in
terms of discrimination. The weight attached to this factor by Justice
Clark was more fully developed in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,7 in which
his opinion for the Court held invalid a Madison, Wisconsin milk inspection ordinance which in effect barred all Illinois milk, as well as some Wisconsin milk, from the Madison market. His technique of stating the issue
gave great clarity to the problem: "Our issue then is whether the discrimination inherent in the Madison ordinance can be justified in view of
the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting
them. 7 He then explained that adequate and non-discriminatory alternatives were available.
Unfortunately for both common sense and clarity, Justice Clark wrote
only the dissenting opinions in the other two major negative implication
cases. One of them, Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor7 s case, is nonetheless a classic example of a different point of view. That weary litigation, challenging 1935-1940 Connecticut corporation taxes, finally was

decided after a judicial journey which had taken it to the United States
Supreme Court twice and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors once.
Spector is a Missouri corporation engaged in interstate trucking. Connecticut attempted to apply to it the state's general corporation tax,
figured on the basis of net income as traced to that portion of the business
done in the state. Justice Burton for the Supreme Court held the tax invalid. He made no objection to the amount of the tax or its method of computation. Rather the tax was invalid for one reason'alone: the Connecticut
70 340 U.S. 179 (i95o).

7,Ibid.,

at 186-87.

72336 U.S. 525 (1949). In Cities Service, the Court said, "The vice in the regulation in-

validated by Hood was solely that it denied facilities to a company in interstate commerce on
the articulated ground that such facilities would divert milk supplies needed by local consumers; in other words, the regulation discriminated against interstate commerce." 34o U.S. 179,
188 (Ig5o).
73340 U.S. 349 (195i).
74 Tbid., at 354.
7S340 U.S. 602 (i951).
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Supreme Court had described the tax as one "on the corporation's franchise for the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate transportation
' '76
in the state.
It did not matter that the tax was non-discriminatory, applying equally
to local corporations doing local business. It did not matter that the identical amount of tax could have been collected, concededly, from the same
company, as compensation for use of the highways, or in lieu of a property
tax, or as a tax for inspection, or sales, or use." The vital factor was the
label placed on the tax by the state: "Even though the financial burden on
interstate commerce might be the same, the question whether a state may
validly make interstate commerce pay its way depends first of all upon the
'
constitutional channel through which it attempts to do so."
The decision deserves whole-hearted applause for its clarity and candor,
and not in satirical or grudging vein. Until now, critics of the decisions in
this branch of taxation had been confused as to whether the validity of
state taxes of this general sort did depend solely on the form of words with
which they were described by the state, or, in the alternative, whether
there was some functional principle of policy involved.9 But this decision
indubitably cuts through substance to form. It is now, for the first time,
completely clear that the whole problem is simply a matter of words, and
no state need make Connecticut's mistake again. Indeed, Connecticut has
already changed the wording of its act, leaving the rate and the incidence
exactly as they were before.5"
But, as Justice Clark pointed out in dissent for Justices Black and
Douglas as well, it is an expensive lesson in draftsmanship: "It has taken
76

.35 Conn. 37, 56, 6i A. 2d 89, 98 (1948).

77These are the alternatives enumerated in the opinion.
78

Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 6o8 (1951).

79 The confusion among students of the subject on this point was precipitated anew by
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) and Int'l Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947),
in which conflicting results appeared to be reached at the same term of court because of divergent wording but similar incidence in the two tax statutes involved. This puzzlement is
reflected, e.g., in Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Col. L. Rev.
211, 226 (1947) where he comments on the Freeman case: "If the quotedlanguage meant merely to indicate one of the phrases forbidden to state tax draftsmen, it reduces constitutional
principle to a formulary riddle; if advanced as a sincere attempt at judicial statement of the
constitutional principle, it merely reinstates an ancient stumbling block and foresakes both
goals of good terminology: utility and clear purpose."
goConnecticut metwordswith words. It added to the tax provision involved the following:
The tax "shall be paid by such corporations or associations for the benefit and protection of the
government and laws of this state, it being the purpose of this section to require the payment
of a tax by all corporations or associations carrying on or doing business in this state, but not
organized under the laws of this state, as an additional recompense for protection of the activities in this state of such corporations or associations." Conn. Pub. Act. No. 350 (1951).
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eight years and eight courts to bring this battered litigation to an end.
The taxes involved go back thirteen years. It is therefore no answer to
Connecticut and some thirty other states who have similar tax measures
that they can now collect the same revenues by enacting laws more
felicitously drafted. Because of its failure to use the right tag, Connecticut
cannot collect from Spector for the years 1937 to date, and it and other
states may well have past collections taken away and turned into taxpayer
bonanzas by suits for refund which come within the respective statutes of
limitations."'"
Other cases of casual interest in transportation are Alabama Great
Southern R. Co. v. United States,82 a cogent opinion by Justice Minton reviewing the factors which the ICC must take into consideration in setting
differentials between rail and barge rates; PanhandleEastern Pipe Line
Co. v. MichiganPublic Service Comm'n, 3 upholding the power of Michigan
to regulate interstate gas sales to industrial users; and United States v.
Champlin Refining Co.,8 4 which is so ungainly a disposition of a precedent
as to deserve further comment on its technique alone. In an earlier case
involving the same company,- the Court had held that the company was
required to file reports under Section i9a of the Interstate Commerce
Act.8 6 Justices Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Burton had then dissented. In the instant case, the issue was whether the same company could
be required to file further reports under Section 20 of the Act,1 and rate
schedules under Section 6.88 All three of these sections purport to cover
"every common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter." That
phrase is defined in Section i of the Act to include "all pipe line companies."8 9 In other words, the coverage clause is identical for the section
earlier interpreted, and for the two sections now interpreted. In logic, all
should stand or fall together.
Justice Clark for the Court achieved the remarkable result of affirming
that Section i9, previously held applicable, was still applicable; that
Section 2o, novr in issue, was applicable; and that Section 6, now in issue,
was not applicable. He conceded that "the literal terms of the statute lend
81Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 614 (1951).
82340

U.S. 2x6 (195I).

8- 341 U.S. 329 (1951).

84 341 U.S. 290 (i95i).
8

s Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29 (1946).
8637 Stat. 701 (1913), 49 U.S.C.A. § iga (195i).
87 24 Stat. 386 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § i (1929).
8824 Stat. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 6 (1929).
8) 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § i (1929).
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some weight" to the view that the three should be interpreted consistently; but "at the same time, we find it hard to conclude, despite the generality of the statutory terms used," 9° that Congress meant to make Section 6
applicable to the same pipe lines to which the other sections were applicable. The four Justices who had dissented in the earlier case concurred
with Justice Clark--on the more logical ground that the earlier case should
be overruled. Justice Black dissented.
Two handsomely turned admiralty cases complete the transportation
collection. In StandardOil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,91 the issue
was the interpretation of a war risk insurance clause of ancient English
lineage. Justice Black for the Court declined to follow the English decisions automatically ("our practice is no more than to accord respect to
established doctrines of English maritime law"),92 and approved application of American proximate cause principles. In the more significant
Warrenv. United States,93 Justice Douglas for the Court wrote that a seaman negligently injured while disporting himself on shore leave was nonetheless entitled to maintenance and cure unless his negligence was so gross
as to amount to wilful misbehavior. The case seems an inevitable extension of the leading modern case on injuries in service of the ship, Aguilarv.
94
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey.
III. CML RIGHTS

a) Speech or Politics
In this space a year ago, I advanced a cyclical theory of American civil
liberties history. That theory was that civil liberties history parallels economic history, but with a peculiar belatedness. Every twenty or thirty
years, we experience an economic Depression, and every twenty to thirty
years we also experience a civil liberties Repression. The Repressions follow about twenty years after the Depressions. The discussion concluded:
Personnel changes in the late forties now reopen the question of whether we are
about to abandon the course begun by the coalescence of Hughes and Roberts with
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone. It may well be that we are about to return to the
doctrines of the twenties.gs
9o United States v. Champlin Refining Co.,

341 U.S. 290, 295, 297 (1951).
93 340 U.S. 523 (195').
92Ibid., at 59.
91340 U.S. 54 (1950).
94 318 U.S. 724 (1943). Transportation cases not discussed in the text were Norton Co. v.

Dep't Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951), invalidating an Illinois retailer's occupation tax insofar
as it applied to orders sent to, and filled from, an out-of-state manufacturer's home office; and
Canton R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951) holding valid under the Import-Export clause a
Maryland gross receipts tax as applied to a railroad engaged in moving goods from trunk
railroads to ships in foreign trade.
9S1949 Term article, at 21.
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At the October 1950 term, the Supreme Court recaptured and outdid
the spirit of 1925. It decided Dennis v. United States,96 a decision of the
broadest social significance of many years. The decision affirmed the conviction of ii Communists. By mid-summer, 65 more were under indictment as part of the same conspiracy. By official Department of Justice
estimate, the decision may result in 12,000 political prisoners within a
short time.97 The catch will far outstrip any collection of political prisoners in previous American history, and will doubtless far surpass any imprisonments of that sort ever made by a democratic country. 98 The profound question, of course, is whether upon achievement of that dubious
glory we shall still remain a democratic country.
The issue was the validity of the Smith Act99 as applied to the principal
leaders of the Communist Party. The defendants were charged with conspiring to organize that Party as a society to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence, and themselves to have
advocated and taught the duty of overthrowing the government. Overt
acts other than teaching and advocacy are not alleged: the defendants
would initiate a revolution "as speedily as circumstances would permit, ' 10
but that time is concededly not now.
With eight Justices participating, there were five opinions. Two were
dissents, by Justices Black and Douglas respectively. The main opinion
was the Chief Justice's, joined by Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton.
Two were concurrences by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, but concurrences in the judgment of affirmance only, and not in the Vinson
opinion.
In the interest of reasonable brevity, the two concurrences may be put
aside in a few words. Certainly the most learned of all the opinions is that
of Justice Frankfurter. It is approximately as long as all the other opinions
put together, and is replete with allusions to a letter by Jefferson to Abigail
Adams, the legislation of Virginia on the Alien and Sedition Acts as re96341 U.S. 494 (i951).
97 "There is a program" to prosecute "roughly 12,000 members of the Communist Party."
Testimony of Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., Hearings Before Subcommittee on Appropriations,
H.R., 82d Cong. ist Sess. 336 (ig5i).
98 The number of persons indicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts was x5, and the
number convicted under World War I sedition legislation was 9oo. Emerson, Essay on Freedom, ii Lawyers Guild Rev. i, 4-5 (i95i). If the "relocated" Japanese of World War II be
counted as political rather than racial prisoners, then the country will probably not reach its
former high since the Japanese numbered almost ioo,ooo. There were, of course, some distinctions between relocation and prison.
9' 54 Stat. 671 (1940), i8 U.S.C.A. § ii (ig5o).
1o From the charge of the trial judge, as quoted in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
51o (igr).
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ported in Tucker's Blackstone (I8O3), The (London) Times, and every
case ever decided on the subject at hand. This opinion is the very epitome
of intellectual liberalism at its most ineffective. It is in two major parts,
the first part setting forth at length that judges are powerless to stop
Congresses from behaving this way; and the second regretting that this is
so because: "Without open minds there can be no open society. And if
society be not open the spirit of man is mutilated and becomes enslaved. ''IoI What it all comes to is that intellectual non-restraint has the
Frankfurter intellectual sympathy, but not his vote.
There is no such dull edge to the Jackson concurrence. He, too, doubts
that the government will do the slightest good by its prosecutions of Communists. ("Communism will not go to jail with these Communists. No
decision by this Court can forestall revolution whenever the existing government fails to command the respect and loyalty of the people.")- °' But
he has no doubts at all of the government's power. The Holmes-Brandeis
clear and present danger approach to freedom of speech Jackson thinks
irrelevant to Communism because it antedates Communism as a nationwide conspiracy; that approach is suitable only for "trivialities" such as
"a hot-headed speech on a street corner," a parade, a pamphlet distribution, or something equally insignificant. The core of this offense is conspiracy, and what one might do by himself (and hence ineffectively) he
cannot necessarily do with others. The "clear and present danger" test is
totally irrelevant to a conspiracy charge. No overt act is needed because
none is ever needed when conspiracy is the offense. The central proposition seems to be that the government can punish any conspiracy to do an
act where the act itself would be punishable; and it is immaterial that the
03
conspiracy may be political advocacy of an act which may never occur.
The main opinion by the Chief Justice is less circumspect than Frankfurter's, less cavalier than Jackson's. It makes these central points:
lox Ibid., at 556.
03 Mr. John

02 Ibid.,

at 578.

Raeburn Green, distinguished St. Louis attorney, in a petition for rehearing for
one of the defendants, says of the Jackson position: "The conspiracy proposal, no matter
how much Mr. Justice Jackson himself would attempt to limit it, puts an end to enforcement
of any of these freedoms, except for extraordinary cases of individual speech. Few, if any, of
the numerous First Amendment cases with which this Court has dealt were cases of an individual speaking for any by himself alone, without prior consultation with anyone. In our
modern world, scarcely anything is done without 'conspiracy,' that is, without a planning
agreement, or understanding of two or more persons.... With deference, it is suggested
that this doctrine would make it possible for legislation to avoid the impact of the First Amendment, to destroy the free exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and
(except in extraordinary cases where an individual speaks without consultation with anyone
else) freedom of speech." Separate Petition for Rehearing of John Gates at 21, 22, Dennis v.
United States (Ig5i).
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(i) Congress unquestionably has power to suppress armed rebellion, and
it likewise has the power to suppress preparation for such rebellion. "Advocacy" of such a course is different from mere "discussion" of it, and
Congress aimed here at advocacy rather than discussion. (2) Upon review
of the cases, it is clear that the Holmes and Brandeis views in the leading
cases of Gitlow v. New York °4 and Whitney v. California'5are sound, those
of the majority in those cases unsound."°6 The Court, the Chief Justice
implies, adheres to the "clear and present danger" test as those two Justices formulated it. But that test does not require a probability of success
of a revolution, or an instantaneous imminence. (3) Enlarging upon this
latter point, the issue, as Judge Learned Hand below said, is "whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." And "[wie are in
accord with.., the trial court's finding that the requisite danger existed.' 0 7 This (4) is a question of law, for the court rather than the jury to
decide.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas are wholly different from each other. Both agree that the Vinson opinion, though in
form adhering to the Holmes formula, in fact departs from it. But Black
suggests that he would, if necessary, advance a new test. In his view, the
First Amendment, "at least as to speech in the realm of public matters" is
an absolute. In that area, the "mere 'reasonableness'" of a regtraint on
speech is no justification for it. Rather, the First Amendment deserves a
'
"high preferred place ... in a free society. 'x0s
This approach by Justice Black moves toward an absolute protection
of political speech. It represents the intensely practical judgment that
once judges can tailor that freedom to the demands of the moment, they
reduce the Amendment to a high-sounding platitudinous admonition.
Where freedom is involved, Black, unlike many liberals, is willing to embrace an absolute. Certainly it is true that 16o years of experience with the
Amendment interpreted as subject to qualifications has in fact left it of
very little use at times of stress.
The Douglas dissent is a conscientious attempt to apply the clear and
present danger test as developed by Holmes and Brandeis in the Gitlow
'05 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
o04
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
"o6"Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the
Holmes-Brandeis rationale." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 ('95').
07 Ibid., at 5io.
X08Ibid., at 579-8I. The parallel of the Black views to those of Meiklejohn, Free Speech
(1948), is notable, and may account for Justice Frankfurter's text and extended footnote 5,
summarizing and criticizing Meiklejohn's stand. Ibid., at 524.
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and Whitney cases. Unlike Black, Douglas concedes the power to limit
speech, but believes that this is no occasion for it. What these defendants
have done is to "teach" certain doctrines. "Not a single seditious act is
charged in the indictment." Speech itself can be limited, but only when
the utterances are in circumstances in which the resort to reason is no
antidote. Mere "advocacy" can never be lawless, except where it would be
immediately acted upon. Yet these defendants, though part of a movement powerful elsewhere, are utterly innocuous here: "In America they
are miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their wares remain unsold.
The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does not make them powerful.I'' ° 9
True, though small in number, the Communists might be so powerful by
location in strategic areas that we must fear, and suppress them. "But the
record is silent on these facts." If we must rely on judicial notice (which
we should not do for we should have facts before us), I believe "that the
invisible army of petitioners is the best known, the most beset, and the
least thriving of any fifth column in history. Only those held by fear or
panic could think otherwise."
It remains to criticize the main opinions, and to calculate their consequences.
Even the attempted objectivity of summary will not have disguised the
sense that, to this reviewer, the Vinson opinion is a disaster in the history
of democracy.110
i. The issues at stake in this great controversy outweigh mere precedents, and our college of elders cannot be expected or desired to resolve
them solely on the basis of what has gone before. But, as a footnote in the
history of ideas, we should at least record that the Vinson opinion claims a
lo9
The quotations in this paragraph are from the Douglas dissent, ibid., at 581-92.
1o This is certainly not the common view. Itis shared by the St. Louis Post Dispatch, which,
in an editorial of June 5,1951, p-2c, col. 2, described the majority opinions under the heading
"Six Men Amend the Constitution": "Never before has such a restriction been placed on the
right to hold opinions and to express them in the United States of America." And the New
York Post, commenting upon the second Communist case begun after the Dennis decision,
said, June 21, 1951, "Does anyone seriously believe this republic is too weak to withstand the
propaganda of the Communist? Does anyone seriously argue that the mere advocacy of Communist ideas carries the threat of ultimate democratic destruction? Only paranoiacs harbor
those terrors.... It is easy to imitate the enemy. But in the long run we believe the citizens of
this Republic-and free men everywhere-will come to revere Justices Black and Douglas and

others like them who refused to join the stampede."
The American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Liberties v. The Smith Act (I951) (pamphlet),
said: "The ACLU disagrees fundamentally with the Supreme Court's 6-2 decision. The Union,
as always, opposes this law because it infringes upon the rights of free speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment and because it isdangerously unwise legislation.... The ACLU stands
ready to help obtain an overruling of the June 4th decision...."
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lineage from Holmes and Brandeis which it does not have."' The voice is
Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.
But there is no real lack of candor here. The Chief Justice in the final
analysis distinguishes Holmes and Brandeis: They "were concerned in
Gitlow" with "a comparatively isolated event bearing little relation in
their minds to any substantial threat to the safety of the community."'
Hence, by implication I suppose, they may be forgiven a little hyperbole.
The fact is that there is nothing in the current situation which Holmes
and Brandeis do not seem to have contemplated. In Gitlow, Holmes would
require "[a] present danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by
force.... If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community,
the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.... An attempt to induce an uprising against the

government at once and not at some indefinite time in the future...
'
would have presented a different question." "3

In Whitney, Brandeis said that speech might be suppressed only if the
danger were "serious," "imminent": "In order to support a finding of
clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious
4
violence was to be expected or was advocated.""
To find in these passages the remotest resemblance to the present position of the Court is to deny that the English language is capable of expressing differences. For at the very instant that reason was routing this
miserable conspiracy, the law has intervened."5
2. At the same time, the opinion is not as restrictive of free speech as
the Gitlow majority holding which it discountenances. This is particularly
important because of the very heavy reliance of the government on that
6
case."
Gitlow did hold that any utterances advocating overthrow of the government were punishable without any regard for the likelihood of the
words having consequences. The Smith Act was modeled on the Gitlow
statute. In the Denniscase, the Vinson opinion tries to split the difference
between the Gitlow majority and the Holmes-Brandeis dissent. It differs
xI For clear analysis and support of the Holmes-Brandeis views see Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test, 63 Harv. L. Rev. z167 (i95o).
112 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (i95).
X13Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
114 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (i927).
"15The thought is suggested by the Douglas dissent, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 589 (i95I), which describes the factors making for the decline of the Party.
t16
A flat reliance on Gitlow was a major part of the government brief.
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from the Gitlow majority in two vital respects: (a) In the Vinson opinion,
following Judge Hand, the precise issue is "whether the gravity of the
'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger";!117 and (b) the Court, not the
legislature, determines that matter.
In other words, the Gitlow rule made valid any statute punishing advocacy of overthrow of the government. The Holmes-Brandeis view would
make such a statute valid only if the likelihood of that result were immediate and pressing. The Vinson opinion makes such a statute valid if,
on the facts as reviewed by the court, there is some appreciable probability
of that result at some remote point in time.
The Dennis case is not as bad as it might be in one other respect; it at
least leaves the issue of "political guilt" a personal one, to be decided from
case to case. It is not a blanket decision which means automatically that
every member of the dissenting group must go to jail. It stresses as the
central issue of the case the "application of the statute to the particular
situation," and emphasizes the leadership position of the particular defendants. By its strong emphasis in note 6, and the accompanying text, on
Justice Brandeis' discussion in the Whitney case of the defendant's privilege to show, on the facts, a want of clear and present danger, the Court
preserves the right to other defendants to make a similar, individualized
showing.
3. The Holmes-Brandeis-Douglas position, or in the alternative the
Black position, is right. Yet one says so under the inherent handicap that
they have said it so much better than anyone else could that to agree is to
parrot. Justice Douglas has set out comprehensively the reasons which
led him to dissent, and his argument will ring for some with eternal conviction.
Let us face the ultimate question: Why should we tolerate the Communist yammer? Why endure voices of those who would gag us, given the
opportunity?
There is the legal answer: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press."
There is the historical answer, well blended with the practical answer:
"Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything,
and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press. It has accordingly been decided by the practice of the States, that it is better to leave a
few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning
Z7 Dennis

v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, SIo

(1951).
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them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits." '

s

Behind that figure of speech lies the greatest wisdom. Mankind has
never learned the art of suppressing by littles. The violence of the spirit
of suppression too quickly reaches beyond the truly wicked to mere nonconformists. Holmes saw the reason: It is because the distinction between
advocacy and incitement, or in this case between education and advocacy,
can not in practice be made. "The only difference between the expression
of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's
enthusiasm for the result."" 9
Finally, there is the moral answer. "Persecution for the expression of
opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your
premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To
allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you
do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out."" 0
Those answers give the Douglas conclusion: The Russians suppress freedom of speech. We must not. "Our faith should be that our people will
never give support to these advocates of revolution, so long as we remain
'
loyal to the purposes for which our Nation was founded.""'2
They lead to Black's hope "that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the
First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong
in a free society."'-

The most familiar argument of the free speech liberal is that one abuse
leads to another, that greater infringements follow lesser, that by "pruning away the noxious branches" the "vigour of those yielding their proper
fruits" is lessened.
118 Report on the Virginia Resolutions, IV Letters and Other Writings of James Madison

544 (1867).

x29 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673
120

12,

(1925).

Abrams v. United States, 25o U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (195).

'

Ibid., at 58i.
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The truth of those fundamentals is never better demonstrated than today. We learn again that political purges catch up the innocuous with the
sinister. Since the Smith Act made red hunting a nationally respectable
sport, many have become eager to join the pack. Loyalty programs and
oath requirements have spread from "sensitive areas" of the national government to all of its branches; the states and municipalities have followed
suit; and, encouraged by the Taft-Hartley Act, private industry and labor
unions have established political tests not for the right of holding significant posts, but for the privilege of earning a living at all. We shall, if
we can, starve the Reds we don't jail; and since we define the offense so
casually, many non-Reds are victimized in the process.
That process was encouraged this year by the Court's decisions in the
political oath cases. The two cases of Gerende v. Bd. of SupervisorsX and
Garner v. Bd. of Public Works-

4

will vastly increase the oath-taking fad.

In Gerende, the issue was the validity of a Maryland requirement that
candidates for public office in elections take oath that they are not (a)
presently engaged in attempting to overthrow the government; or (b) are
knowingly members of such an organization. The two ingredients thus are
either overt acts, or membership in an organization doing such overt acts,
with scienter. This the Court unanimously upheld.
The careful limitations of the Gerende oath are not present in Garner,
involving the Los Angeles oath for municipal employees. The Los Angeles
oath required in 1949 has these elements: The employee must swear that
he has not (a) for five years past (b) advised, advocated, or taught overthrow of the government; and that he has not (c) been a member of an
organization with such purposes in that time, or (d) been "affliated" with
such an organization; and (e) he will not be guilty of such conduct in the
future. This oath requirement of 1949 was based on a 1941 amendment to

the Los Angeles charter by the California legislature which forbade the
enumerated types of conduct, but provided no sanction. The principal
challenge was that the oath requirement is a bill of attainder.
2
The three leading bill of attainder cases are Cummings v. Missouri,I
" ex

pare Garland,126 and United States v. Lovett.12 7 "A bill of attainder is ... a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial," according
to Cumming.Yf8 Cummings and Garland were, respectively, a priest and a
123341

U.S. 56 (r95i).

'25 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (1867).

26 4 Wall. (U.S.) 383 (1867).
U.S. 303 (1946). For discussion of these cases in terms of the contemporary situation, see Wormuth, On Bills of Attainder, 3 West. Pol. Q. 52 (195o).
1284 Wall. (U.S.) 277, 287 (i867).
124341 U.S. 7x6 (ig5i).
127328
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lawyer who would have been precluded from the practice of their professions by state or federal requirements that they take oaths that they had
not, in effect, supported the Confederacy. In Lovett, three government employees were stricken from the federal payroll by the Congress. In all three
cases the oath requirements or the payroll exclusion were held bills of
attainder.
Those cases were distinguished by Justice Clark for the Court's majority on the ground that, following the Cummings quotation above, "punishment is a prerequisite," and no "punishment is imposed by a general regulation which merely provides standards of qualification and eligibility for
employment." The legislation in the instant case was found analagous not
to that of the Cummings and Garland cases, but rather to perfectly permissible legislation such as "a statute elevating standards of qualification
to practice medicine." The Lovett legislation was distinguished on the
ground that it "named individual employees" rather than establishing
"general and prospectively operative standards.""29
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting as to the oath, emphasized the differences between this and Gerende. There, present conduct and scienter were
required. Here the requirement is retroactive, there was originally no requirement of scienter; 30 and since "affiliation" is differentiated from
"membership" by the terms of the oath, its meaning is particularly misty.
Justice Burton dissented flatly on the ground of conflict with the three bill
3
of attainder cases.' '
Justice Douglas, for Justice Black as well, analyzed the bill of attainder
cases in some detail and found the Los Angeles oath squarely within them:
"Petitioners were disqualified from office not for what they are today, not
because of any program they currently espouse, not because of standards
related to fitness for the office but for what they once advocated. They are
32
deprived of their livelihood by legislative act, not by judicial process."'
It is indeed astonishing that the majority is unable to see any significant
difference between the exclusion from public office of a person who fourand-one-half years earlier was "affiliated with" an undesirable organization, on the one hand, and a statute putting present requirements for the
practice of medicine. As Justice Burton said, the ordinance "leaves no
room for a change of heart."' 33.
129The quotations in this paragraph are from Garner v. Bd. of Public Works, 34, U.S.
722-23 (i9sx) and the case cited as illustration of the power to raise medical standards
is Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
13The Court modified the ordinance by its own interpretation, and read in a requirement
716,

of scienter as well as other limitations. Garner v. Bd.of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723 (1951).

X3'Tbid., at 735-36.

"2Ibid.

33bid., at

729.
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Its significance is ominous. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: "If this
ordinance is sustained, sanction is given to like oaths for every governmental unit in the United States. Not only does the oath make an irrational demand. It is bound to operate as a real deterrent to people con' s4
templating even innocent associations." "
Against the wind of opinions such as Dennisand Garnerstood one straw.
It was JointAnti-FascistRefugee Committee v. McGrath,13s challenging the
Attorney General's subversive list.
Three organizations sought declaratory judgments and injunctions for
removal of their names from the list. The list itself is prepared by the Department of Justice for the immediate use of the federal loyalty board, and
purports to be a listing of "totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive"
organizations or those which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence."'" 36 The list in fact,
however, has far wider circulation than to the loyalty board alone, and is
used by state and local governments and by private organizations as an
37
enumeration of proscribed organizations.
Inclusion on the list is so deleterious to an organization that Justice
Burton, in the only majority opinion joined by two Justices, held that the
Attorney General would be required to justify his listings in the courts.
The issue, it is vital to note, rose on the government's motion to dismiss
the complaints of the organizations. The complaints, which sought removal of each of the three organizations from the list, alleged that the
organizations were blameless, and that their inclusion on the list was an
arbitrary act. The government, by its motion to dismiss, necessarily conceded the truth of these allegations, contending that the listings were not
open to judicial review. The result of the Burton ruling is to send the cases
to trial, at which the government will have to make a showing of the
grounds for the inclusion of these organizations.
The main point of this holding is that the Attorney General may not
make "patently arbitrary" listings. This the Executive Order authorizing
the listings did not contemplate, and therefore no constitutional issue is
reached. "The doctrine of administrative construction never has been carried so far as to permit administrative discretion to run riot.""135 The issue
is justifiable because the listing is "defamatory" and most injurious to
134Ibid.,

at 727-28.

13s34I U.S. 123 (195).

136 13 Fed. Reg. 147x, 1473 (1948).

137 For a recent discussion of use of such lists see Barrett, The Tenney Committee (ig5i);
and for a list, see ibid., at 335-60.
1z3 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 34x U.S. 123, 138 (ig5i).
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bona fide organizations; and the Attorney General is not immune from
suit when he exceeds his powers.
The decision was five to three, Justice Clark not participating. There
are five majority opinions, only justice Douglas concurring with Justice
Burton, and Douglas filed a, separate opinion as well. The four opinions
other than Burton's are based on so much broader grounds that they must
be considered separately.
The Frankfurter opinion most closely holds the common ground of the
other four majority Justices. After extended consideration of the issue of
justiciability, he reaches the question of whether the list itself violates due
process, quite apart from any showing which the Attorney General may
make in response to this complaint. He concludes that it does. "[DIesignation has been made without notice, without disclosure of any reasons justifying it, without opportunity to meet the undisclosed evidence or suspicion on which designation may have been based, and without opportunity to establish affirmatively that the aims and acts of the organization
are innocent.' ' 39 After elaborate consideration of the requirements of procedural due process in this situation, he finds "the wholly summary proc' °
ess for the organizations is inadequate."' 4
By different roads, the other three majority Justices reach this same
result. Indeed, it must be emphasized that the Frankfurter position is the
minimal ground held by the others. The Black and Douglas opinions
would not rest the liberty of thought and views involved on a merely procedural ground, and particularly on so narrow a base as want of notice and
hearing. In the Black view, while the entire procedure is illegal on First
Amendment grounds, if this hurdle is overcome, the employees are still
entitled to jury trial.'1' The holding thus becomes (a) four Justices for the
proposition that the very existence and publication of the Attorney General's list is a denial of procedural due process; (b) one Justice for the
proposition that the Attorney General must justify his list in open court;
and (c) three Justices dissent on the pleading point and, more important,
'39

Ibid., at 161.
at 173.

r40 Ibid.,

14' Justice Jackson believes that hearings on the making up of the list must be allowed, not
for the sake of the organizations which by themselves might not be heard to complain, but
because the list is used in loyalty cases against government employees, who never have an
opportunity to challenge it. Justice Black believes that even with hearings, the publication of
the list would be "a most evil type of censorship," ibid., at 143; and Justice Douglas believes
that the whole "loyalty system" of which these lists are a part is unconstitutional, ibid., at
18o-S.
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declare that the organizations have no rights of due process as to the list.'1'
The dissent, by Justice Reed for the Chief Justice and Justice Minton,
argues that while the list harms the "prestige, reputation, and earning
power" of the organizations, it "does not prohibit any business of the organizations, subject them to any punishment or deprive them of liberty of
speech or other freedom." "The petitioners are not ordered to do anything
and are not punished for anything.' '43Therefore any judicial inspection of
the list interferes with executive prerogative.
The Attorney General's List case must be considered in conjunction
with Bailey vi. Rickardson, 44 in which the validity of the entire loyalty program for federal government employees was challenged, basically on due
process and first amendment grounds. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had, two to one, upheld the validity of that program.
With Justice Clark not participating, the holding below was affirmed by
an equally divided Court, "without opinion."
One may put "without opinion" in quotation marks because never have
secret ballots been more clearly cast into a gold fish bowl for all to see. Six
of the Justices, precluded from expressing their opinion on the loyalty program in the Bailey case by the tradition against filing opinions where the
Court is equally divided, expressed themselves on the Bailey case in the
Attorney General's list case. It becomes perfectly obvious that the division on the loyalty program was Justices Reed, Burton, Minton, and the
Chief Justice to affirm the Court of Appeals, and Justices Black, Frank142 As to the meaning of the decision, particularly in view of the split among the majority'
there is a great divergence. McCarran, The Supreme Court and the Loyalty Program: The
Effect of Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 37 A.B.A.J. 434 ('95'), would reduce the majority
ruling to a pleading conclusion only, readily rebutted by evidence at trial, and he repels the
suggestion that "the President should drastically amend his Executive Order." Mr. Richardson, former chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, construes the opinion as meaning that
"suitable preliminary hearings should be granted" to organizations. Richardson, The Federal
Employee Loyalty Program, 51 Col. L. Rev. 546 (I95i). See the review of Richardson's work
at p. 402 infra.
More authoritative is the opinion of the Second Circuit on the issue of whether, in a perjury
case, the government may suggest defendant's membership in the Communist Party by referring to the Attorney General's list. The Court said, citing the instant case: "The list is a purely
hearsay declaration by the Attorney General and could have no probative value in the trial of
this defendant. It has no competency to prove the subversive character of the listed associations and, failing that, it could have no conceivable tendency to prove the defendant's alleged
perjury even if it were shown that he belonged to some or all of the organizations listed."
United States v. Remington, 1gr F. 2d 246, 252 (C.A. 2d, i95i).
On the other hand, subsequent to the decision the American Federation of Radio Artists
adopted an amendment to its constitution barring persons affiliated with organizations on the
list from membership. Red-Proof Radio, Business Week 40 (Aug. 25, 195i).
143 Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 202-203 (i95i).
'44 341 U.S. 918 (x95i), lower court opinion 182 F. 2d 46 (App. D.C., i95o).
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furter, Douglas, and Jackson to reverse. Justice Reed tied several pages of
expression of approval of the loyalty program to the three-Justice dissent
in the list case, while Justices Black, Douglas, and Jackson very explicitly
showed their disapproval of the Bailey affirmance.' 45 Thus there could be
doubt only as to the positions of Justices Frankfurter and Burton, but the
tone of their respective opinions makes fairly clear that their stands were
as stated. '46 The Douglas opinion in the list case is the most elaborate dissent to the affirmance of the loyalty program, and reduces to a few concise
pages the constitutional vices of a program which would have been held
unconstitutional by the switch of one vote on the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.
There were other free speech cases, of which only one can be discussed
in the text. 47 In Feinerv. New York,'4 8 the Court returned to the question
of the power of a state to suppress speech where the speech itself is legal,
but provokes a disorderly response. Two years ago, that question had
come up in connection with Father Terminiello, whose rabble rousing had
caused him to be found guilty by a Chicago jury under a charge from the
bench which declared to be illegal conduct that which "stirs the public to
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance." The Court, through Justice Douglas, had held that the principles of free speech precluded conviction on the ground that speech not
itself illegal "invites dispute" by others. Justices Frankfurter, Burton, and
245Reed: Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. I23, 2o6-213 (I951);
Black: ibid., at 143-44; Douglas: ibid., at 179-83; Jackson, ibid., at i85.
,46 Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of Loyalty Order procedure, says: "Whether such procedure sufficiently protects the rights of the employee is a different story." Ibid., at 173. The
factors which lead him to his result as to the list would very probably give the same result on
the Loyalty Order itself.
147Not discussed in the text are Nietmoko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), a routine case
on refusals to issue a license to Jehovah's Witnesses to use a park; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (i95 1), another routine case, this time on street licensing of an offensive speaker where the
city licensing system sets no standards; and Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (i95i). In the
Breard case, the issue is the validity of one of the so-called Green River ordinances forbidding
solicitors to approach homes unless invited. The defendant was a magazine salesman. In upholding the ordinance, the Court distinguished Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943),
which had invalidated a restriction on the distribution of religious literature door to door, but
which had carefully reserved the problems of "commercial" activity. Chief Justice Vinson
dissented on commerce clause grounds, as did Justice Douglas; and Justices Black and D ouglas dissented on the ground that the decision overruled Martin v. Struthers and other cases.
The highly commercial activity involved here is so different from that of Martin v. Struthers
that it is difficult to see any nectssary inconsistency between that case and Breard. However,
Justices Black and Douglas emphasize that"Itthe constitutional sanctuary for the press must
necessarily include liberty to publish and circulate. In view of our economic system, it must also
include freedom to solicit paying subscribers." Breard v. Alexandria, supra, at 650.
148 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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Jackson dissented on the merits, and Chief Justice Vinson on other
49
grounds.
The Feiner case put approximately the same question over again. In
Feiner,the speaker was making a pro-Wallace speech on a street comer in
Syracuse, New York. The speech was offensive to his audience, and "at
least one [auditor] threatened violence if the police did not act."-'5 ° On the
other hand, some auditors favored the speaker. The police made no effort,
of the smallest sort, to control the crowd or to restrain the one onlooker
who made a threat. Instead they arrested the speaker, who was convicted
of provoking a breach of the peace. The conviction was upheld by the
Supreme Court by a majority consisting of the four Terminiello dissenters
plus Justices Reed and Clark, who was not then on the bench. Justices
Black, Douglas, and Minton dissented.
The majority conceded the "possible danger of giving overzealous police
officials complete discretion to break up otherwise lawful meetings"; but
this, they said, is different because it is "incitement to riot." How one is to
know and recognize that fine line where a "speaker passes the bounds of
argument or persuasion" is not discussed and will give great difficulty.''5
Justice Black, dissenting, feared the creation of a "simple and readily
available technique by which cities and states can with impunity subject
all speeches" to censorship. Of course the police can prevent breaches of
the peace. "But if, in the name of preserving order, they ever can interfere
with a lawful speaker, they first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him.",152 Justice Douglas expressed a similar thought: "A speaker may
not, of course, incite a riot .... But this record shows no such extremes.
It shows an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one man to haul the
speaker from the stage. It is against that kind of threat that speakers need
police protection."'13
The Terminiellocase was not mentioned by the majority or one dissent,
and was cited in passing in the other. Its status is doubtful.
One other acute problem has been presented in connection with the
large volume of "political cases" now in the courts. That is the problem of
obtaining counsel for the allegediy disloyal.
It is now, as I can personally vouch from some observation, almost impossible to obtain "respectable counsel" in the political cases. Public opin'49 Terminiello

v. Chicago, 337 U.S. i, 3 (1949).
1soFeiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317 (i951).
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,s5Ibid., at 320,

Ts3Ibid.,
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ion has risen to such a point that many lawyers believe they will be professionally ruined if they take such cases, even at fair compensation. The
number of attorneys like Charles Evans Hughes, who spoke out against
the tide in the 20's, or like Wendell Willkie, who on principle represented a
Communist in the Supreme Court, has been small. There have been some
exceptions. The Washington law firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter made
the attack on the Loyalty Program in Bailey v. Richardson. Mr. John
Raeburn Green of St. Louis has filed a petition for rehearing for one defendant in the Dennis case. My colleague, Professor Emerson, is arguing
one motion in trial court in the now pending second string Communist
case. There are doubtless a few others as well.
But these acts have been startlingly rare, and for the most part the
parties have been compelled to take counsel from among a very small
group of the bar. At the present time, with trial of the second string Communist case in the immediate future, no full staff has been assembled to
handle the case despite the fact that District Judge Ryan, seeing the problem, has made substantial efforts to obtain a panel.
This problem was peripherally before the Court in two aspects of the
Dennis case. Counsel for the Communists pleaded that they could find no
one at the American bar, despite requests made to twenty-four lawyers, to
5 4
handle their case in the Supreme CourtY
They asked for permission to
employ an English barrister. The Court granted that permission, but refused to postpone the date of argument, which in effect nullified the
grant. 5 s Justice Frankfurter added a note to that order, saying that
counsel if needed would be appointed, but that those already in the case
were obviously competent.
The trial attorneys in the Dennis case were held in contempt by the
trial court, an order affirmed by a divided Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting from
the denial.x 6 While the trial attorneys probably well deserved to be held in
contempt, Judge Clark in the Second Circuit raised serious questions of
the legality of the procedure of the trial judge in that respect. 57 In any
,S4 Their list is undocumented, and may not be wholly bona fide. In some instances, there is
reason to suppose that they refused to accept ordinary conditions of control by counsel.
s 340 U.S. 887 (1950).

"s6 Sacher v. United States, i82 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, i95o), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951).
Certiorari was granted on a petition for rehearing at the beginning of the October 1951 Term,
2o L.W. 3103 (1951).
's7 The subject is reviewed in Harper and Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 6o
Yale L.J. i (ig5i).
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case, the contempt order, deserved or not, has intensified the difficulties in
obtaining counsel in such cases.
So that these cases might be adequately heard in the Supreme Court,
the Chicago Bar Association suggested to the American Bar Association
that it establish a panel of counsel for the Dennis case. The refusal of the
Supreme Court to extend the time for argument made it impossible to
carry through this plan. True, the Communists have to some extent put
themselves into their present position by the tactics of their trial counsel
in the Dennis case; and they are doubtless maximizing the difficulty of
obtaining counsel for propaganda purposes. But there is enough actual
difficulty to make something like the Chicago Bar's plan necessary if the
great tradition of the Bar is to be maintained. s8
b) Criminal Procedure

The difference in interests of the Truman Court from its predecessor has
brought a basic change in the nature of the criminal procedure cases before
it. As was noted last year, most of the "fair trial" cases are now swept
under the rug of certiorari denied. This year most of the criminal procedure cases turned on either self-incrimination or the meaning and application of the federal Civil Rights Acts.xs9
The self-incrimination cases make an easy bridge from the political
cases, because most of the self-incrimination cases involved questions
about Communist affiliation. In the main decision, Blau (Patricia)v.
United States,,6° the petitioner refused to answer questions before a grand
jury on her alleged association with the Communist Party. In a few words
'58 "A second contribution which I think the Bar may make relates to fair administrative
and legislative hearings for persons under investigation and fair trials for persons accused of
crimes involving security. The Bar has a notable tradition of willingness to protect the rights
of the accused. It seems to me that if this tradition is to be meaningful today, it must extend
to all defendants, including persons accused of such abhorrent crimes as conspiracy to overthrow the Government by force, espionage, and sabotage. Undoubtedly some uninformed
persons will always identify the lawyer with his client. But I believe that most Americans
recognize how important it is to our tradition of fair trial that there be adequate representation
by competent counsel.
"Lawyers in the past have risked the obloquy of the uninformed to protect the rights of the
most degraded. Unless they continue to do so in the future, an important part of our rights
will be gone."
Letter, President Truman to Arthur B. Freund, Chairman, Section on Criminal Law,
Amer. Bar Ass'n, Sept. 1, 195i, as published in N.Y. Times § L, p. 1o, col. 2 (Sept. i9,1951).
's9
Cases not in these areas are Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951),
interpreting Rule 17c of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in respect to subpoenas of confidential documents; and Dowd v. United States ex rel Cook, 340 U.S. 2o6 (i95i), on the relation of Indiana post-conviction review procedure and the right of habeas corpus in federal

court.
"6'340 U.S. 159 (1950).
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Justice Black for the Court held that the questions need not be answered
since, with the Smith Act on the books, "she reasonably could fear that
criminal charges might be brought against her if she admitted" the association. It was not necessary that the admissions themselves be enough to
convict her if they would be "a link in the chain of evidence needed."''
The Blau case is simple enough; it takes no remote supposing to see a
link between the testimony sought and the Smith Act. Hofman v. United
States,'6' on the other hand, is an extreme development. Hoffman, possessor of a police record, was called before a federal grand jury investigating rackets in Philadelphia. He was asked a number of questions, particularly concerning his association with one Weisberg, who was eluding the
grand jury. Hoffman declined to answer questions (a) as to his present
occupation; (b) as to when he had last seen Weisberg; (c) as to when he
had last walked to Weisberg on the phone; and (d) as to whether he knew
where Weisberg was. The Court held that he need answer none of these
questions.
In view of Hoffman's extensive record, it is reasonable to suppose that
responses as to his present occupation might get him into as much trouble
with the law as Blau's answers about her politics. Hence Justice Clark for
the Court readily found that refusal to answer met the test, "from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
'6
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. '
But to find danger of entanglement in the criminal law in the questions
as to Weisberg's location (as distinguished from some other readily imaginable dangers) is far-fetched in the extreme. Hoffman has violated no
law, no matter what answer he gives to those questions, unless in the
Court's words he has been "hiding or helping to hide another person of
questionable repute sought as a witness."' 6 4 In this case there is absolutely
no reason to suppose that Hoffman was hiding Weisberg except that he
had known Weisberg for many years and that they were both suspected as
racketeers. Nothing in the record shows any past close collaboration between the two. What such a record does suggest is that Hoffman may well
have some information about Weisberg's location.
This makes a sharp difference between the Blau and Hoffman cases. In
6
1 1 Ibid., at i61; and see Blau (Irving) v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951). For recent
discussion of the privilege, with full citation to the literature, see Meltzer, Required Records,
the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.687

('95').
162 341

U.S. 479 (195).

z6 Ibid., at 486-87.

64Ibid., at 488.
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Blau, any answer which gives the government anything worth having
may involve petitioner under the Smith Act; and it is highly likely from
all the circumstances that the answer will be incriminatory. The possibility that Hoffman is hiding his old acquaintance, in view of the number of
places a person might hide in the United States and in view of the fact
that the possibility is based solely on long acquaintance and a somewhat
common interest, seems negligible.
One trouble with this kind of over-expansion of the right against selfincrimination is that it inevitably leads to technical constructions of the
right which may reach into the very zone in which it is supposed to be
effective. This is all too well illustrated in the case of Rogers v. United
States.6 s Rogers, like Blau, was interrogated before the Denver federal
grand jury on possible Communist associations. Rogers was apparently
unaware of the privilege against self-incrimination. She did admit having
been Treasurer of the Denver Communist Party, but refused to identify
the party to whom she had later turned over the books and records because
of unwillingness to get another person into trouble. This refusal was not
based on the privilege. When brought before the district judge, she was
given one day to consider the matter and then for the first time retained
counsel. On the next day she declined to answer not merely this question,
but any questions on her Communist associations, on the ground of the
privilege. She seems either to have found out about the privilege from her
counsel or in open court on the next day from discussion in other related
cases. The Chief Justice for the Court held that the privilege had been
waived, that she could not be allowed "to select any stopping place in the
testimony." Rather, "where criminating facts have been voluntarily revealed, the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details.""
If the opinion had been rested solely on other available grounds, as that
the identification of the other individual was not incriminatory, the results
would not be so serious. But this rigid application of the doctrine of waiver
does, as Justice Black, dissenting, said for Justices Frankfurter and Douglas as well, "[create] this dilemma for witnesses: On the one hand, they
risk imprisonment for contempt by asserting the privilege prematurely; on
the other, they might lose the privilege if they answer a single question.
The Court's view makes the protection depend on timing so refined that
lawyers, let alone laymen, will have difficulty in knowing when to claim
it.)367
's 340 U.S. 367 (195 1).
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That is exactly what has happened subsequent to the opinion. Several
persons interrogated by the federal district court in New York concerning
their relations with a certain Communist-favoring bail fund have had to
face the alternative of contempt or waiver. They have chosen contempt,
apparently on the theory that they would prefer the probably lighter
penalty for contempt to possible conviction under the Smith Act. One has
already been held in contempt twice, for refusing to answer seemingly innocuous questions about the fund. When interrogated for purposes of this
article, his counsel explained with apparent sincerity that the waiver
hazard was too great."68
The basic result of this year's self-incrimination cases seems to be reaffirmation of the familiar principle that one may refuse to answer direct
questions which might implicate him under the law even though that
prospect, as in the Hoffman case, is extremely remote. Yet if the questions
start from a point sufficiently collateral to the main issue, the witness may
be caught in the waiver-contempt dilemma. The possibility that many
persons will lose the privilege by waiver, as did Rogers, through sheer
ignorance of its existence is greatly lessened by the wide-spread publicity
given the Senate Crime Committee, whose televised hearings during the
year just passed have made the privilege familiar to millions, and have
caused it to be claimed more widely than ever before.
There remain the cases under the federal Civil Rights Acts of I87 o and
1871.169 Of this group, only Williams v. United States 7 0° directly involves
criminal procedure; but Collinsv. Hardyman'7' and Tenney v. Brandhove'72
involve such similar issues that all may be considered together.
There were three Jay G. Williams cases in Court this year, all arising
from one basic fact situation. A Miami, Florida, lumber company suffering
from thefts employed a detective agency headed by Williams to find the
thieves. Williams was also a "special police officer" in Miami. He, two of
his employees, and one regular policeman seized a number of persons, and,
using the most savage brutality, including beatings with rubber hose, sash
cords, pistols and clubs, obtained "confessions."
Williams and his associates were indicted under Sections 241 and 242 of
Title i8 of the United States Code. (i) He was convicted, though his associates were not, under Section 242. The trial court declared a mistrial
under Section 241. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Wil' 6 As this article is written, these cases are pending in the Second Circuit.
x6'

16 Stat.

I41 (x870),

ed, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43
?70

as amended, i8 U.S.C.A. § 242 (1950); 17 Stat. 13 (1871), as amend-

(1942).

See notes 173-75 infra.

171341

U.S. 651 (i95i).

12' 341

U.S. 367 (1951).
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liams under Section 242 in this group of cases." 73 (2) On retrial, all four
were convicted under 241. This the Supreme Court reversed.' 74 (3) For
their conduct in the cases just mentioned, Williams and the others were
convicted of perjury. 7 5 This was affirmed. The first two cases will be referred to here as the 242 case and the 241 case, respectively.
A. The 242 case. This section provides: "Whoever, under color of any
law, statute, ordinance ... willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any inhabitant of any State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities" shall be fined or imprisoned." 6 It was this provision
which had been interpreted in Screws v. United States, 17 in which Sheriff
Screws had been given a new trial on the issue of intent when charged
with similar conduct. Justice Douglas, who had written the main opinion
in the Screws case, spoke for the majority in this case and added much
helpful clarity to the earlier decision. He held first, following Screws
closely, that Williams had acted "under color of law," rather than as a
private person, in that he had at least "a semblance of policeman's power
from Florida.""11

8

This set the stage for the main issue, also raised in Screws, whether the
statute is void for indefiniteness because a policeman cannot be expected
to know what anything so obscure as "rights, privileges or immunities"
are. Indeed, the Court has trouble itself in making up its mind. Douglas'
rejoinder is a triumph of common sense: The words are uncertain, and
some day the Court may be faced with a marginal situation in which a
policeman might have trouble in making up his mind. In that case, the law
may be inapplicable because of its indefiniteness. But in this case, no
policeman could conceivably have any doubts.
The major new contribution of the Williams case is its quotation with
approval of the charge of the trial judge on the issue of intent. The Screws
case stirred the fear that an impossible standard of intent was being required by the Court. In this case the trial judge used a good, simple charge
which makes intent ascertainable largely from objective acts and leaves
the statute thoroughly workable. 7 9 Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and
Minton dissented, adhering to the Screws case dissent, and Justice Black
also dissented.
173 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (i95i).
174 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
175United States v. Williams, 34i U.S. 58 (1951).
x76 62 Stat. 696 (1948), as amended, x8 U.S.C.A. § 242 (1950).
S945)0
U.S. 91 (
ii325
178 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951).
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B. The 241 case. The dissenters in the previous case added the Chief
Justice to their number in this case and thus became a majority. Section
241 differs from 242 in these principal respects: 241 is directed at conspiracy, 242 at the substantive act; and 241 covers injury to citizens in
"any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States," without reference to "color of law,"'' 8 ° while 242 refers to
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States," which are invaded "under color of law."
Analysis of the sections just quoted shows that they are virtually identical. Justice Frankfurter found, however, that they mean quite different
things. 241, he said, in part because it does not have the "color of law"
limitation, is, oddly enough, to be given a narrower construction than the
clause which does have the limitation. It is to be construed as applying
only to invasions of that small category of rights which the federal government can reach even if they are not invasions "under color of law." That
is to say, 241 applies only to (a) invasions by private individuals, not state
officers acting under color of law, of (b) those rights which are peculiarly
federal such as, principally, the right to vote.
Although the Frankfurter opinion is the prevailing opinion, it can not
be called the majority opinion; it represents the views of four Justices, and
so does that of Justice Douglas, which is in f#at disagreement. The case is
thus controlled by the vote of Justice Black, who concurred with the
Frankfurter result on wholly independent and unrelated grounds.'18 On
the interpretation of Section 241, therefore, the Court is evenly divided;
and the weight of reason and of history seems overwhelmingly with Douglas. The absence of the "color of law" restriction in Section 241 should
make it obvious that its coverage was intended to be slightly broader,
rather than narrower, than its companion. It would have been an amazingly bizarre drafting device to limit a statute by deleting its words of restriction.
Collins v. Hardyman arose from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Ku
Klux Act, passed to restrain the activities of that and similar groups during Reconstruction.112 The core of the provision establishes a remedy in
damages for any party injured by any group of persons who, inter alia,
xSoi6 Stat.

I4z (1870), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 47(3) (i942).
xsx
Black thought the case governed by res judicata.
282
341 U.S. 651 (i951). Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (g5x) also arose under the
1871 Act. In that case, Brandhove sued Tenney for damages on the ground that Tenney and
his associate members of the California legislature's Un-American Committee had conspired to
violate Brandhove's rights. The Court avoided the kind of issues discussed in the text by the
holding, in this case, that the statute was inapplicable to acts of state legislators.
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conspire to "go ...on the premises of another" for the purpose of depriving their victims of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws.' 5 s3 In this case a group of Legionaires allegedly
broke up a meeting in California of persons gathered together for the purpose of discussing national issues and of petitioning Congress for a redress
of grievances. The plaintiffs were those in attendance at the meeting, the
defendants were those who allegedly broke it up. The issue was whether
the complaint stated a cause of action.
To avoid what it regarded as serious constitutional issues, the majority
through Justice Jackson, gave an extremely rigid construction of the Act.
He declared that the defendants, while they had unquestionably invaded
rights of the plaintiffs, had not deprived them of "equal protection" or of
"equal privileges and immunities," since their rights under the laws of
California remained quite unaffected by the invasion. The plaintiffs are
put to their rights under the laws of California.
8 4
The decision is influenced by United States v. Harris,
the Reconstruction decision holding unconstitutional a similar provision establishing
criminal penalties for violation by private persons of Fourteenth Amendment rights. To avoid the force of that decision, the plaintiffs had carefully claimed a right not under the Fourteenth Amendment but under the
First, the right to petition Congress. Justice Burton, dissenting for Justices Black and Douglas, thought they should have been successful.
This decision, because of the constitutional reasons given for the narrow
statutory construction, is another blow at the power of the federal government to deal with private invasion of the rights of citizens. The insistence
on overt "state action" is a renewed affirmation of the powerlessness of the
federal government to deal directly with, for example, lynching. 85
What these cases interpretive of Reconstruction legislation have in common is an emotional and moral sense of judicial opposition to the legislation of that era. One need not reduce analysis of the judicial process to
speculations about what the judge had for breakfast to agree with the
thoroughly familiar maxim that his opinions are largely a product of his
conditioning. Today's cases may be decided in terms of the symbols accepted in high school and elementary college work.
No era is more subject to those symbolic associations than Reconstruc18317

184

Stat. 13 (r871), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. §47(3) (1942).

io6 U.S. 629 (1883).

Iss For an analysis of the historical material leading to the conclusion that this view is historically unsound, and that the Harris case was a basic departure from the plan and purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws," So Col. L. Rev. 3I, 162-66 (ig5o).
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tion. In the beginning, the radicals wrote the history and deified their
heroes. The corruption and cheap politics aspects of Reconstruction were
minimized, and Andrew Johnson was made a drunken fool. The counter
movement, largely under the profound and useful influence of Professor
Dunning of Columbia, led to the Democratic interpretation of the era
which is now largely unchallenged. In this view, Sumner and Stevens were
fanatical tyrants, Johnson was glorified, and the Reconstruction was nothing but a barbecue for carpetbaggers and scalawags. There is also a very
recent modern revisionist school which finds no necessity to take a partisan viewpoint. 86 This view results in a far more complex picture than the
others. It concedes that, for example, Sumner may in different aspects of
his character have been both an egalitarian and a tyrant; that some
Southerners were trying both to salvage what they could of the slavery
system and to protect themselves and their families from outrageous exploitation of thieves and fools. To give another example of the revisionist
approach, it is possible that the hated scalawags, or Southern post-war
"Collaborationists" were not entirely aspiring job holders without principle, but in some instances were the earnest remnant of the Whig
7
party.x8
Objective interpretation of Reconstruction legislation requires some
detachment from the legendary heroes or devils of the era. But as these
cases show, revisionism as a school of historical thought has not yet
reached the Supreme Court, and the job of interpreting the laws is approached in that corruption of the Dunning tradition to which most
Americans of middle age are educated. Justice Frankfurter in the Williams
group begins his interpretation with general criticism of Reconstruction
legislation: The time was "not conducive to the enactment of carefully
considered and coherent legislation. Strong post-war feeling caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws relating to
the new political issues."'18 8 Justice Jackson in the Collins case is more detailed: "The Act was among the last of the reconstruction legislation to be
based on the 'conquered province' theory which prevailed in Congress for
a period following the Civil War." It "was passed by a partisan vote in a
highly inflamed atmosphere. It was preceded by spirited debate which
pointed out its grave character and susceptibility to abuse, and its defects
8

6 On the comparison of the revisionist view with others, see Hesseltine, A Quarter Century,
etc., 25 J. Negro Hist. 44o, 445-48 (194o); Williams, An Analysis of Some Reconstruction
Attitudes, 12 J. South. Hist. 469 (1946).
1
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See, e.g., Donald, The Scalawags in Mississippi Reconstruction, io J. South. ist. 447

(Y944).
ss United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (i95I).
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were soon realized when its execution brought about a severe reaction."
(The sole citation given to reflect the Justice's source of information on
the "background of this Act, the nature of the debates which preceded its
passage, and the reaction it produced"' is Bowers, The TragicEra (1929),
as grossly partisan a work as there is on the subject.) The Court of the
70's, which virtually emasculated the Fourteenth Amendment, is then
praised, its members "all indoctrinated in the cause which produced the
Fourteenth Amendment, but convinced that it was not to be used to centralize power so as to upset the federal system."'' 9
My point is this: If the Court approached the Reconstruction legislation, not in the spirit of opposition to the enormities of a band of venomous
madmen, but in that spirit of objectivity which guides its approach to, for
example, the federal rules, these extremely limiting interpretations would
not result. This opposition spirit is doubly unsound. It precludes an objective twentieth-century assessment of the social desirability of some parts
of this legislation, and prevents a sifting and winnowing of that which
might, for our time, be good, from that which is bad. It is also unsound
even at the level of technicality. If the Court really supposes, as does Justice Frankfurter, that this legislation was "inconsidered and incoherent,"
and filled with "loose and careless phrasing," or that it was, as Justice
Jackson believed, purely partisan and abusive, then one could not possibly conclude that it contains the neat, careful, elaborate distinctions
which these Justices read into it, and that its coverage is so pin-point
small. The Justices insist on having it both ways: this was simultaneously
shotgun legislation and the finest legal lace work on the books.
SUMMARY OF CIVIL RIGHTS POSITIONS

A summary of the positions of the Justices in the divided civil rights
cases follows. As always, such data must be read with the greatest care, for
they may be misleading. Comparisons with previous years must make
some incalculable allowance for the fact that the departure of Justices
Murphy and Rutledge from the bench during the period for which these
figures are compiled broke up the group of four which previously had been
able to grant certiorari in many civil rights cases. Denials of certiorari
undoubtedly kept some potential cases out of the table which might more
fully have highlighted divergences of view between Justices Black and
Douglas and some of their colleagues.
When all the necessary qualifications are made, this table nonetheless
has substantial residual value. If a given Justice's decisions put him pre89Collins v. Hardyman,

341 U.S. 651, 656-58 (I95i).
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ponderantly in one column or the other, then the figures contain a clue or
hint as to his basic attitudes about civil rights.
There were sixteen divided civil rights cases at the 1950 term. 9 0 Disqualifications result in some Justices having less than this number.
The same data for the 1949 and 1950 terms only, presented separately
to make clearer the relationship of Justices Clark and Minton to the rest
of the Court, are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMIOUS CIVIL
RIGHTS CASES, I946-I95o
IN SUPPORT oF Cri.MZD RIGHT

Vinson ........

195o
3

1946- Per Cent
of Total
So
15%
13

194649
10

13
Black .........
4
Reed ..........
Frankfurter .... 9
14
Douglas .......
3
Jackson ........
7
Burton ........
3
Clark ..........
2
Minton ........

53

66

76

10

14

16

34
49

43
63

49
84

20
13
I

23
20
.4:

27
23
22

3

5

16

IN DENIAL O CLA EMDRIGHT
Per Cent
19461946of Total
so
49
1950

12
3
12

62
i8
62

7

38

2
13

9

74

85%

21

24

74
45

84
51

10

12

16

50

63

73

59

68

77

7

7

14

12

14
26

84

78

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL
RIGHTS CASES, 1949-1950
IN SUPPORT OF
CLAIMED RIGHT
Per Cent
1949-50

Vinson .........
Black ..........
Reed ...........
Frankfurter .....
Douglas ........
Jackson .........
Burton .........
Clark ...........
Minton .........

5
27

6
20

16
9
io

4
5

IN DENIAL OF
CLAInED RiGHT

of Total

1949-50

17%
87
19

25

65

89
29
32
22

r6

Per Cent
of Total

4
25

83%
13
8

I

35
2

22
22

14
26

II

71
68
78

84

so The divided civil rights cases were: Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. .93 (I950);
Blau (Irving) v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (195i); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951);
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (I95i); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (951);
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (i95i); Garner v. Bd. Public Welfare, 341 U.S. 716 (1951);
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (I95i); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (i95i); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); Kunz v. New York,
34o U.S. 290 (I95'); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (I95i); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (ig5i); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (i95I); United States v. Williams,
341 U.S. 70 (195); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (i95i). Chief Justice Vinson is
treated as not participating in the Breard case for purposes of this table since his vote is cast
upon a point distinct from the civil rights issue which concerned the other eight Justices.
Unanimous civil rights cases, not included in the table, are Blau (Patricia) v. United
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IV. LAWYERS' LAw
a) Federaljurisdiction, procedure, and related subjects
For intriguing technical questions, the 195o term was a lawyer's feast,
with at least eight cases of distinct interest. 9' Major problems were raised
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.,'9 In one, the issue was whether the
government could be impleaded by a defendant as a joint tort-feasor under
the Act, and the Court held that it could.193 In the second, the Court
unanimously decided that the government could not be sued for injuries
94
borne by soldiers incident to military service.1
The military liability case involved three different situations. In one,
the deceased allegedly burned to death as a result of negligent quartering.
In a second, deceased allegedly died because of an army doctor's malStates, 340 U.S. 159 (195o); Dowd v. United States ex rel Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (ig5r); Gerende
v. Bd. Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (i95i); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (ig5i); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 5o (r95x).
The table in the 1949 Term article, 37-38, contained an error in the list of cases, called to
my attention by Mr. Irving Dilliard of the St. Louis Post Dispatch. In note 142, Building
Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (i95o), was erroneously listed as nonunanimous,
and Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (ig5o), which was a nonunanimous civil rights case, was
omitted. However, this error occurred in the footnote only, and not in the Table, so that the
figures given remain unchanged.
19,Not otherwise mentioned in the text are Amer. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6
(r95z), on the removability of a suit against local and foreign defendants under the provision
of 28 U.S.C.A. § I44i(c) (i95o) for removal of a "separate or independent claim or cause of
action." In this case the original claim was made in a state court against a local defendant, the
insurance agent, and two foreign insurance companies. One of the insurance companies removed, and judgment was obtained only against it. It was nonetheless allowed subsequently
to raise the issue of the legality of the removal precipitated by itself, and to defeat the removal
because theclaim againstit had notbeen "separateor independent." Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S.15
(i95o) holds that where an action is against a named government official who retires during its
pendency, his successor must be substituted within the statutory time or the action abates.
(In the Finn case, Justice Douglas, dissenting, expressed the view that petitioner, having removed his case and lost it, "is now estopped from having it remanded." Amer. Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Finn, supra, at ig. In the Snyder case, Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court.
There the government lost in the trial court, and it wrongfully took the appeal in the name of
respondent who had retired. Nonetheless, here, said Justice Douglas, is a "declared policy of
Congress not to be altered by... some theory of estoppel." Snyder v. Buck, supra, at 19.
If estoppel can keep a defendant from benefiting from his own jurisdictional error under one
section of the judicial code, why not another?)
In Missouri ex rel Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 34o U.S. i (i95o), it was held that a state
may apply its own forum non conveniens doctrine to bar a Federal Employers Liability Act
case from its courts. In United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (i951), the Court
held that only the Attorney General, and not a subordinate, may be directed by a court to
produce papers of the Department in court. As a practical matter, this requires that such suits
be brought in the District of Columbia, and renders immeasurably more difficult the requiring
of papers in criminal litigation. What good is served by this awkwardness is not disclosed.
'926o Stat. 812, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1950).
193 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (z95).
"94Feres v. United States, 34o U.S. 135 (1950).
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practice. In a third, the plaintiff claimed that a towel had negligently been
left in his abdomen by an army doctor. Justice Jackson, in an admirable
and thoughtful opinion, held the Act inapplicable. He readily distinguished Brooks v. United States, 95 which had permitted recovery for a
soldier injured by government negligence while on furlough-in that situation, the soldier stands in the same position as the remainder of the public.
But the soldier on duty is protected by a cordon of federal regulations and
laws quite outside the Tort Claims Act, and there is no apparent great
utility in pulling them under that statute.
Of major importance in the field of review of state administrative regulation is Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co. 96 The suit
was a diversity action brought in federal court to enjoin the operation of a
Commission order concerning termination of service on particular lines.
The jurisdictional issue was whether such a suit can be brought in federal
court.
Eight years ago, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,197 the Court had, five to four,
held that a somewhat similar suit to enjoin an order of the Texas Railroad
Commission could be brought only in a state court. The Burford case was
open to either of two interpretations: either it was a comprehensive decision as to state administrative agencies generally, or it was a very specialized situation peculiar to the Texas oil problem and to the unusual agencycourt relationship in Texas oil law. In this year's Southern Ry. case, seven
Justices agreed, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, to push Burford to its
maximum interpretation, and the present suit was ordered dismissed from
federal court on its authority. The point here, as in Burford, was not one
of jurisdictional power; it was whether, as a matter of equitable discretion,
a federal court ought to decline to exercise jurisdiction in these administrative agency cases.
Surely if the federal courts have an equitable discretion, they should
exercise it here. Every federal issue can be raised in the Supreme Court no
matter which route the case follows, and all the considerations of avoidance of needless tension in federal-state relations apply in state administrative order cases generally.9' The opinion of the Chief Justice marshals
many reasons for its result. All this being true, the only real puzzle in
the case is the vigor of Justice Frankfurter's argument in disagreement,
19 3 3 7 U.S. 49 (1949).

z96341 U.S. 341 (1951).

191319

U.S. 315 (1943).

X98
The cases are comprehensively reviewed in the Burford opinion; and see Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943). For further discussion see Contraction
of Federal jurisdiction, p. 361 infra.
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in which Justice Jackson joined, that the holding is "in flagrant contradiction with the unbroken course of decisions in this Court for seventyfive years."' 99 The ruling, on the contrary, seems to be the inevitable de20 0
velopment of a path which Justice Frankfurter himself helped to map.
It is a prerogative of the critic to be perverse, and as a result, Justice
Frankfurter can be belabored for excess of caution in the case just mentioned, and for excess of innovation in the most novel jurisdictional case of
the year, West Virginia v. Sims.2 °" This is the West Virginia compact case.
Eight states entered into a compact concerning pollution of the Ohio.
Congress approved the compact. Subsequently, in an action in state court
appropriately raising the issue, the West Virginia Supreme Court found its
own state's act ratifying the compact invalid under the state constitution,
principally on the ground that it violated Art. X, Section 4, limiting the
capacity of the state to contract debts.
The Supreme Court reversed this opinion of the West Virginia Supreme
Court in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter which substitutes the Supreme
Court's own interpretation of Art. X, Section 4, for that of the West Virginia Court. The Supreme Court's opinion concludes: "In view of these
provisions, we conclude that the obligation of the State under the Com2°
pact is not in conflict with Art. X, sec. 4 of the State Constitution."
The Court, in three opinions, offers three possible grounds for reversing
West Virginia. The first is Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion, that the
Court has the power to reinterpret state holdings on its own constitution
in the peculiar area of the compact clause, despite the fact that for virtually all other purposes, the state is the final authority on its own law.
The second ground'is that of Justice Reed, who flatly disagrees that the
Supreme Court may interpret the state constitution for itself "unless it is
prepared to say that the interpretation is a palpable evasion to avoid a
federal rule."'2 3 He seems (for his opinion is not extensive) to accept the
argument of the United States, on the side of the petitioner, that the Compact Clause "must be read as an affirmative grant of power to States to
enter into interstate compacts, subject only to the necessity of obtaining
the consent of Congress; that this provision of the Federal constitution
necessarily takes precedence over all State statutes and constitutions; and
99Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 362 (i95).
R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (194); and see particularly R.R. Comm'n
of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 31o U.S. 573 (194o), opinion modified, 311 U.S. 614
200

(1940).

2*'341 U.S.

22

(1951).

2'

Ibid., at 32.

203 Ibid., at 33.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 19

that any attempt by a State, by its Constitution or otherwise, to impose
further limitations on its power to enter into such compacts must fail because of conflict with the Constitution of the United States. ' 204 As Justice
Reed himself puts it: "Since the Constitution provided the compact for
adjusting interstate relations, compacts may be enforced despite other'
wise valid state restrictions on state action. 20s
Finally there is Justice Jackson's solution. This compact was ratified by
West Virginia in 1939, by Congress in i94o. This suit involves West Virginia appropriations for a period ten years later, 1949-5o. justice Jackson
sees this as a case of estoppel. "Whatever she now says her Constitution
means, she may not apply retroactively that interpretation to place an
unforeseeable construction upon what the other States to this Compact
were entitled to believe was a fully authorized act."'2 6 Assuming that the
West Virginia court is to be reversed, Justice Jackson's method is satisfying. Granted, as he says, that "[e]stoppel is not often to be invoked
against the government."' 20 7 It is nonetheless sufficiently shocking to one's
sense of justice that a state should be able to take itself out of a contract
with seven other states ten years after the event that the handy elasticity
of estoppel can well make a convenient bar.
The Reed approach, making the state constitution irrelevant to the
issue on the theory of an overriding compact power, has the possible vice
of proving too much; by this device a state might escape any of its constitutional limitations merely because another state agreed and Congress
gave consent. But, on the other hand, this may be a completely fanciful
fear for our actual experience with compacts does not support it.2 8 Moreover, it does have the support of Hinderliderv. La Plata Co.,209 which he
claims for it. In the Hinderlidercase, Justice Brandeis overrode an interpretation of Colorado law by the Supreme Court on the ground that there
are two methods of settling interstate disputes, the judicial and the legislative, and "[tihe compact-the legislative means-adapts to our Union
of sovereign states the age-old treaty-making power of independent sovereign nations.1'"" ° Brandeis seems (for the opinion is somewhat ambigu204

Brief for United States, at 2o, West Virginia v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (i95i).

20s West Virginia v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 34 (1951).
2o6Ibid., at 35.

207 Ibid., at 36.
o08For an extremely good general article on compacts, with full reference to the literature,
see Regional Education: A New Use of the Interstate Compact?, 34 Va. L. Rev. 64 (1948),
which discusses the approximately one hundred compacts since 1789.
209 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
20 Ibid., at 1o4.
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ous) to be developing a theory that judicial interpretation is, as Reed says,
irrelevant to the establishing of binding compacts, and applies only to
their interpretation.
The Frankfurter approach gives a different reading to the Hinderlider
case. But the clincher for the Reed approach is that Hinderliderat no point
attempted actually to interpret the Colorado law, as Frankfurter does the
West Virginia law. Insofar as the Frankfurter opinion departs from the
customary rule against federal interpretation of a state constitution, it is
undesirable; for it unnecessarily pits the judgment of the federal as against
the state judiciary on a point on which the federal judiciary has far less
competence than that of the state.
b) Fullfaith and credit
Recent divorce decisions have held that where a husband and wife of
state A go to state B to obtain a divorce, and both are present in person or
by counsel in state B and have full opportunity to raise the issue of the
jurisdiction of state B's courts there, neither will be permitted to raise the
issue of B's jurisdiction in subsequent litigation in state A.21' But the
question of the rights of third parties to make that challenge had not been
closed.
The difficulties arise because the holding that both parties are bound if
they appear is based on res judicata. But res judicata is not, strictly speaking, available as a bar to a person, as a child, who was not a party to state
B's divorce. The issue is raised under the most extreme conditions in this
year's Johnson v. Mueberger,2- in which a child of a first marriage challenged her father's divorce from a second marriage in a dispute over the
father's estate with the wife of his third marriage. The divorce from wife
No. 2 is thus both challenged and upheld by persons who were not parties
to it.
The challenged divorce took place in Florida. This action between child
of wife No. i, and wife No. 3, took place in New York. The Florida jurisdiction for the challenged divorce was in fact spurious. New York held
that its courts could review the validity of the Florida divorce. Justice
Reed for the Supreme Court reversed, and rounded out the recent developments in this branch of the law with this corollary: The right of the state
of the forum to permit a collateral attack upon a divorce depends, not
upon its own law of collateral attack, but upon that of the divorcing state.
2!? The most recent case is Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), discussed by many,
including Paulsen, Migratory Divorce, 24 Ind.L.J. 25 (1948).
212340

U.S. 58x (19z).
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In this situation, if Florida would have permitted the child to raise the
issue of the validity of the Florida divorce, then New York should do so.
Otherwise New York may not do so. Upon examination of the (very
skimpy) Florida law on the subject, it was held that Florida would not
have permitted the attack.
The case is completely consistent with the policy of the recent divorce
cases, notably Sherrerv. Sherrer.213 If the parties to a marriage are to be
allowed, as Sherrer does allow them, to get a divorce from any state that
will not inquire too scrupulously into its jurisdiction, there is very little
reason to allow a child to unsettle the situation. As Professor Paulsen, a
close student of the subject, says, "it is difficult to see why a child should
be permitted to raise doubts, in a collateral proceeding, about the validity
of his parents' divorce.' '214 The "quickie" divorce states can now, if need
be, patch up their own law of collateral attack, and thus render their six
week residence requirements immune from attack. The evils of divorce by
consent would not be appreciably rectified by leaving a loophole in the
law.
V. Tm INSTiTUTioN AND ITS JUSTICES
THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTION

Again this year, the most striking aspect of the work of the Court was
its declining quantity. This year the number of cases was 88.2' s For the
immediately preceding years, the number has been: 1949-94; 1948-122;
1947-Ii9. Before World War II, the docket usually ran to 2oo and more

cases a year.
This reduction in the size of the docket is due to two major factors.
First is the rigidity with which the writ of certiorari is being granted.
Second is the decline in cases worthy of consideration. If certiorari were
granted in all the cases in which it might rationally be granted, the num213

334 U.S. 343 (1948)-

214

Paulsen, Divorce Jurisdiction by Consent of the Parties,

26 Ind.

L.J. 380, 383

(I95I).

2S The same method of counting cases has been used uniformly throughout this series of
articles. Counted are those cases which were (a) argued, and (b) decided with an opinion
which is more than a single word of affirmance or reversal with citations. For example, Crest
Specialty v. Trager, 341 U.S. 912 (ig5i), is not counted because, although it was argued, the
order of disposition consists entirely of, "Per curiam: The judgment is reversed. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147."

The greatest compilation difficulty arises in connection with companion cases. Simple companion cases are not included. For example, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Ry. Employees v. Wis.
Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (ig5i) and the companion cases of St. John v. Wis. Emp. Rel.
Bd., 340 U.S. 411 (ig5i), and Bus Employees v. Wis. Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 416 (igsi), are

treated for all tabular purposes as one case. More complex companion cases, which require
serious discussion of at least one independent point, are counted separately.
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ber of cases would still not reach the pre-War docket figures, but the number would be considerably greater than it now

2

is.

11

The fact is, as was noted last year, that three Justices as prolific as
Hughes, Brandeis or Stone (or Black or Douglas, for that matter) could
have written all the majority opinions at the past term with no perceptible
strain. The purpose of the Certiorari Act of 1925 27 was to reduce the docket to a manageable level, not to leave the Court with nothing to do. There
is a Knute Rockne legend that one of his players asked to be excused from
practice one afternoon because he was to attend a dance in the evening.
Rockne excused him without comment. When Saturday came, the boy
was not used, and so again the next Saturday, and the next. Finally he
asked Rockne when he would play.
Said Rockne, "I'm saving you."
"For what?" asked the boy.
"For the junior prom," was Rockne's answer.

The same question can be asked here: What is the Court saving itself
for?
Professor Harper and his collaborators have set themselves the task of
discussing the certioraris denied so completely that it is unnecessary to go
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJORITY OPINIONS

Vinson ................

8

Black ................. ii
Reed ..................

io

Frankfurter ............ 8
Douglas ............... ii

Jackson ................

8

Burton ................. 8
Clark ..................
9
Minton ................ 9
Per curiam ............. 6

into the details here.211 However, appended to this article is a list of some
certioraris which might well have been granted.
The distribution of majority opinions" 9 among the Justices is shown in
Table 3.

The extent to which the views of particular Justices have prevailed can
best be measured by concentrating on the most important of the decisions,
216 Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Do in the 1949 Term, 99 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 293 (195O), compile a list of all the cases they think might conceivably have been
granted at the 1949 term. The list is 65 cases. If all had been granted, the docket would still,
by pre-World War II standards, have been light. My own list of possible grants last year, less
comprehensively gathered, was i8 cases. 1949 Term article, 53, 54.
27 43 Stat. 938 (1925), as amended, 62 Stat. 928 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254 (i949).
218

Their article cited in note 216, supra, is to be followed by a series.

2"9 This, too, has its complicationsin the few cases in which there is no opinion of the Court.
In those instances, the case is listed for the Justice who announced the judgment of the Court.
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and for this purpose I have chosen, as objectively as possible on so subjective a matter, the two groups of cases which seem to me to have the most
important consequences to society. The first group consists of the nine
cases which seem the most significant of the year.- ° The second group of
eighteen cases are definitely less important, but are not routine.22, The
data in Tables 4 and 5 are taken from these two groups. Disqualifications
or, in one case, an opinion dubitanke give some of the Justices fewer than
a total of twenty-seven.
TABLE 4
2

VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES 3
MAjomRY VoEs
Total

Major Important
JUSTICE
7
x6
Vinson ..........

Black ...........

Reed ............

4
8

Frankfurter ......

6

Douglas .........
Jackson ..........
Burton ..........
Clark ............

5
9
5
5

Minton ..........

6

DiSSENTING VosS
Major Impoitant
Total

23

2

2

o

14

5

7

14
9

22
17
13

1,

16

24
21

14
12

8
15

4
12

2

4
7

5
9

4

10

14

0

3

3

4

2

6

19

i

4

i8

3

3
3

6

The foregoing data show, as would be expected with the generally conservative trend of the Court, that Justices Black and Douglas are most
often in the minority in important cases. For the first time in the last five
20 Blau (Patricia) v. United States, 34o U.S. 159 (r950); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S.
65i (ig5i); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (i95i); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(ig5i); Garnerv. Bd. Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 7z6 (I951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (I95I); United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (I95i);
RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (i95i); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, 341 U.S.
384 (i95).
-2 Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Bus Employees
v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (ig5i); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (i95i); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.
341 U.S. 558 (i95x); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (i951); Johnson v. Muelberger,
340 U.S. 58I (1951); NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(ig5i); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (i95g); Norton Co. v. Dep't Revenue,
3 4 0 U.S. 534 (19si); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n,
341 U.S. 329 (i95i); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,
340 U.S. 231 (1951); Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (i95i); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (ig5i); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (195a); Univ. Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (ig5i); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (I95i). Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) is not included because of the uncertainty of which majority (i.e. the majority on which point) to use for tabular purposes.

Justice Frankfurter, in RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (195*
Where a Justice dissents on a minor point only, or concurs on a minor point but disagrees on the main point, his vote is counted on the major issue. Thus the concurring votes of
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co.,
34r U.S. 341 (195 ) are treated as a dissent because of their disagreement on the main matter.
3
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years, Justice Jackson is the Justice most often in the majority, in part a
product of the trend toward his views both in the area of restriction of
freedom of speech and in the area of expansion of the commerce clause as a
limitation on state power.
Table 6 shows the distribution of agreements among the Justices in the
major and important cases.
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE IN MAJORITY,
MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES

85%
54

Vinson ..................
Black ....................
R eed .....................
Frankfurter ...............
Douglas ..................
Jackson ...................
Burton ...................
Clark .....................
M inton ...................

82

65
48
89
78
83
75

TABLE 6
AGREEMENT AMONG JUSTICES IN MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CASES
Vinson

Vinson ......
Black .......
Reed ........
Frankfurter.

Douglas.....
Jackson ......
Burton ......
Clark .......
Minton ......

Frankfurter

Jackson
20
13
21

Burton
19
14

Clark

13
12

Douglas
II
19
12

i8

17

16

..

II

18

17

10

13

12

13

13

8

18

I6

17

.. ..

14

Reed
22

14
22

..

1i

II

..

13
19
13

12
12
21

I1

..

18

19
18

14

18

17

12
13

12

17

10

13

20

12

I6

13

8

13
II
20

Black

13

I8
i6
17

i8

Minton
20

12

12

..

17

I6

17

..

13

i6

13

Justices most often in agreement were Chief Justice Vinson and Justice
Reed. Justices least often in agreement were Justices Douglas and Minton.
THE WORK OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

On this bench, which history will record as the Vinson Court, the Chief
Justice remains a surprisingly obscure figure. On the one hand, for the
past two years of frequently divided decisions, he has almost invariably
been of the majority in the important cases. Yet the cases which he assigns
to himself are frequently modest, and in the remainder one seldom gets the
sense of a distinct personality.
During his four years, the Chief Justice has consistently upheld restrictions on freedom of speech except in the most obviously precedent-con-
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trolled situations. His opinions in the Feiner and Dennis cases are thus
in his personal tradition. But while the Dennis case has been severely
criticized in this article for its policy, that criticism should not lap over on
its technique. Assuming that freedom of speech is to be limited, the Chief
Justice's is a workman like way of doing it, as clear as a landmark decision
is likely to be, contemplative, and far more moderate than the excessive
positions asked by the government and offered by the concurrences of
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. The opinion is a thoroughly fair expression of its point of view. So with his opinion on the Wisconsin public utility
strike act,22 s which is direct, succinct, and comprehensive.

One trifling embarrassment for the Chief Justice was a per curiam opinion in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks,226 in which he was com-

pelled to swallow some poorly-thought-through prose of a few years before. Four years ago he wrote an opinion giving the Tillamooks a judgment against the United States for an ancient taking of the Indians' land.
That judgment, if it rested on anything, necessarily rested on Fifth
Amendment "just compensation" principles, for the earlier opinion excluded every possible other basis on which it might have rested.22 7 This
year the issue was whether the tribe should have interest on that judgment, to which they were entitled if it was a just compensation award.
The per curiam, in denying the interest, declared that the previous judgment had not rested on just compensation, and again discreetly avoided
disclosing what its basis was.
The Chief Justice must bear responsibility for what is probably the
most artless opinion to emerge from the Court in some years. The case is
Jordanv. DeGeorge,-s and the issue is whether an,alien who was twice con=24See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (i95o); cf. a precedentcontrolled situation, this year's Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (195i), and Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290 (i951).
-s Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (i951).
=6341 U.S. 48 (i95i).

=7 United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946). The earlier opinion said
that the jurisdictional act under which the case was brought "neither admitted nor denied
liability. The Act removes the impediments of sovereign immunity and lapse of time and provides for judicial determination of the designated claim. No new right or cause of action is
created. A merely moral claim is not made a legal one. The cases are to be heard on their
merits and decided according to legal principles... ." Ibid., at 45. Those legal principles, the
opinion went on, were to be found in such cases as United States v. Creek Nations, 295 U.S.
103, 110 (1935). But the Creek Nations case, with its allusion to "pertinent constitutional
provisions" and its other citations shows clearly that if there was any "legal" and non-moral
base for the original claim, it must have been the Fifth Amendment. See Cohen, Handbook of
Indian Law 94, 96 (1945). This year's case thus presents a most mysterious turn-about for
the Chief Justice and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, all that is left of the earlier majority.
-8,341 U.S. 223 (1951).
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victed of liquor tax avoidance had been guilty of "moral turpitude" for
deportation purposes. The following quotations are here strung together
from six pages of the opinion:
Our inquiry in this case is narrowed to determining whether this particular offense

involves moral turpitude.... Without exception, federal and state courts have held
that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude. In the construction of the specific section bf the Statute before us, a court of appeals has stated that
fraud has ordinarily been the test to determine whether crimes not of the gravest

character involve moral turpitude. In every deportation case where fraud has been
proved, federal courts have held that the crime in issue involved moral turpitude....
In the state courts, crimes involving fraud have universally been held to involve
moral turpitude.... In view of these decisions, it can be concluded that fraud has
consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that

American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of
moral turpitude. It is therefore clear, under an unbroken course of judicial decisions,
that the crime of conspiring to defraud the United States is a 'crime involving moral
turpitude.'... Whatever else the phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' may mean
in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.... Fraud is the
touchstone by which this case should be judged. The phrase 'crime involving moral
turpitude' has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct.
One gets the impression that there is some connection between fraud
and moral turpitude.
For Justice Black, the term was a consistent series of defeats on everything that is really important to him. No judge in America holds firmer
views of constitutional opposition to restrictions on speech. No one is more
opposed to loyalty programs. The Dennis case," 9 the Feiner case, 3 ° the
Los Angeles Oath case,23' the piddling ground gained against the loyalty
program inthe JointAnti-Fascistcase2-these are blows at his most fundamental convictions.
Black's main task of the year was recording that opposition. From the
structure and brevity of his opinions, it appears that he has given up comprehensive in favor of very pointed opposition. "It should be plain that
my disagreement with the majority of the Court as now constituted stems
basically from a different concept of the reach of the constitutional liberty
of the press rather than from any difference of opinion as to what former
cases have held," he says in Breardv. Alexandria ss and in Dennis he adds
to the same thought: "Consequently, it would serve no useful purpose to
-9341 U.S. 494 (1951)230 340 U.S. 315 (1951).

2'2 341 U.S. 123 (4951).

2'3
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (195J).

23' 341 U.S. 622, 65o (1g5).
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state my position at length."'2 4 Yet that desire to strike with one blow
may result in opinions too elliptical; in Dennis, there are only two paragraphs on the critical issue, and a little more would have been helpful.
There is a hint of disagreement with the "clear and present danger" approach without clear suggestion of what should be substituted.
In other zones, Black's work shows its usual qualities of crisp competence. Outstanding opinions are the self-incrimination cases, Blau and

Rogers (dissent) ;2s5 a war risk insurance case ;236 and a full faith and credit

37
case involving a Wisconsin action on an Illinois wrongful death statute.
On the debit side, the dissent in the Dean Milk case 35 in which he would
uphold the Madison, Wisconsin, prohibition on sales of milk not pasteurized in the neighborhood could only have been written by a Justice
who was very deeply committed to the proposition that state regulations
of commerce can scarcely ever burden it.
If there had been any lingering doubts that Justice Reed is still the
Court's middle-of-the-roader, its "swing man," they were erased by the
work of the term. It was a successful and productive year for him, one on
the road to becoming intellectual leader of the new majority. As was predicted last year, Reed is becoming the Sutherland to Vinson's Taft-i.e.,
the writer of many of the most important and most serious opinions of the
new Court. In technical zones, he was, happily, called upon with frequency, with such good results as Johnson v. Muelberger,239 the case of the
"quickie" divorce challenged by a child who was not a party to it; and
StandardOil Co. v. New Jersey, 4° an extremely good opinion upholding a
New Jersey escheat statute.
In basic matters of social policy, Reed continued to exhibit great caution. His opinions in the United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.24 1 and Timken
Roller BearingCo. v. United Staes242 antitrust cases, the first refusing fully
to strengthen the decree and the second striking a body blow to divestiture
as an antitrust remedy, are typical of his unwillingness to put real bite
behind the bark of the Sherman Act. In matters of free speech, Reed is the
234 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951).
2s

Blau (Patricia) v. United States,

340 U.S. 332 (1951);

Rogers v. United States,

340 U.s.

367 (195').
236

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,

34o U.S. 54 (1950).

'37 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 6og (ig5i).
238Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (i95i).
239 340 U.S. 58I

(ig5i).

240

341 U.S. 428 (i95i).

24' 340 U.S. 76 (1g5o).

'4 341 U.S. 593 (i95i). The Timken case is so much more important than U.S. Gypsum
that it may be misleading to allude to the two together.

1952]

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1950-51

hardest-hitting of the opponents of liberalism. His dissent in the Joint
Anti-Fascistcase 43 is one of the most thorough systematizations of reaction
on the books. It is, given its point'of view, one of the best opinions of the
year. He faces Justice Burton's pleading points head on. He meets the
question of right to sue by demonstrations that no rights of the petitioners
are abridged, contends that no legal injury is done the organizations by
their listing, and manages to turn the discussion off to the safe ground of
noninterference with administrative discretion. The listing he analogizes
to a grand jury investigation: "These petitioners are not ordered to do
anything and are not punished for anything."'' 44 The argument is massively (but not excessively) supported with the paraphernalia of the law
library, the orders, the cases, the statutes, the English materials. Everything is considered, except what the listing actually does.
The occupational hazard of judging for Justice Frankfurter is making
up his mind and getting things done245 This is worth comment because it
is more than one man's psychological quirk; it is symptomatic of the
plight of the intellectual liberal in our times, torn between opposing absolutes. Frankfurter's Dennis opinion, as was said earlier, is an epitome of
intellectual ineffectiveness; it is many pages of consent to what the legislature has done, followed by many pages of regret that they have done it.
One half or the other of that essay is irrelevant to the judge's function.
The one thing the public ought to get from its judges is some kind of
6
decision, one way or the other. In Canton R. Co. v. Rogan24
Justice Frankfurter joins Justice Jackson in "reserving judgment"; as far as they are
concerned, the case is not decided at all. And in RCA v. United States24 7
the color TV case, the Justice's opinion (neither a concurrence nor a dissent) is "dubitante," and consists of a general, and rather interesting,
essay on the facts of color television, without any resolution of the issues
brought to the Court for decision. As one of the Justice's friends is reported to have said to him, "I agree with everything you say, but will
deny to the death your right to say it."
243 Joint
244

Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (I951).

Ibid., at 203.

245No new development: "Justice Frankfurter considers the actual decision of cases by the

Supreme Court of less importance than some other Justices, carrying his doctrine of nonaction
for that tribunal to the point of systematic philosophy. In a very substantial number of cases,
he would either not decide the case as a matter of some general policy or remand it for further
proceedings before he would consider it ripe for decision. This year he was either alone or in a
small minority in seven cases which he thought not suitable for decision." 1948 Term article,

49.
246 340 U.S. 511 (1951).

247

341 U.S. 412 (1951).
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When this inconclusive quality spreads to the whole institution, cases
are undecided by the Court as a whole. The Justice's opinion in Universal
CameraCorp. v. NLRB,248 described at length above, is a superb analysis
of the intent of Congress as to judicial review of administrative orders; but
just when the inconclusiveness and haziness of the Congressional will is
laid bare, the whole problem for administrative agencies generally is sent
back to the lower courts without any concrete leadership as to what they
are to do.
There are major Frankfurter credits to be noted. The UniversalCamera
49
is
discussion has been mentioned. The dissent in the Schwegmann case
as good an example as there can be of working out legislative history, and
acquiescing in it. The Williams case, interpreting the Civil Rights Act of
1871, may be, as was argued above, unsound; but it is an excellent and
ingenious attempt to make its case.2 50 The opinion in the case on federal
court review of state administrative agencies is a concise job of massing all
the favorable precedents, and distinguishing away those unfavorable.25
A decision on Missouri's right to dismiss FELA cases on forum non conveniens grounds is clear and crisp. 2 A concurrence on the right of a district court to subpoena Department of Justice records is considerably
s3
more clear than the opinion of the Court which it accompanies.2
In terms of personal accomplishment, this is very probably Justice
Douglas' outstanding year on the Court. In 1950-51, he was the batter
who couldn't strike out. His Dennisdissent' 5 4 clear, artful, and strong, will
stand with the great expressions of Holmes and Brandeis in the free speech
cases. His majority opinion in the Schwegmann case knocking out state
fair trade laws as applied to "non-signing" merchants is, at least, a tour de
force. His opinion in the Joint Anti-Fascist case ss should appeal even to
those who disagree with it as a powerful statement of the case against the
loyalty program. His majority opinion in the Williams group5 6 eliminates
248340 U.S. 474 (i951). The principal institutional consequences of this philosophy of indecision is probably felt in the certioraris denied; the declining docket may be in part due to
urgings by the Justice that this case, and that, and the other one should not be decided "now."
249 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (795i).

2SO
United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (195).

251Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S.
2s2 Missouri ex rel Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S.

1

341,

351 (195).

(1950).

253United States ex rel Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 470 (195i).
24 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (195i).
2ss

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951).
majority opinion in this group is in 341 U.S. 97 (1951), the dissent, ibid., at 87.

256The

1952]

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1950-51

many of the uncertainties of the earlier Screws case, 5 7 and his dissent in
that group is as clear as it is hard-hitting.
There are a few things with which to quibble. Why did the Justice, who
has consistently opposed invalidation of state laws under the commerce
clause, join in a dissent by justice Frankfurter which is a most fulsome
praise of the very decisions to which he has dissented? S8 Why, in one case
in which the continuance of one Reiss in the matter at the trial stage is
extremely relevant, does the Douglas dissent say that Reiss was "dismissed from the case," while the majority opinion of Justice Reed says:
"The request of respondent to dismiss Reiss after judgment was not acted
upon by the trial court"? 59 Which is right? But the details do not obscure
the main line. A year which includes the opinions listed above is a very
satisfactory year indeed.
For charm and felicity of expression, Justice Jackson tops the bench.
Some of his colleagues can get as much meat into a sentence, but none can
garnish it as well. Examples: His dissent in the liquor tax-moral turpitude
case (mentioned a few paragraphs above): "I have never discovered that
disregard of the Nation's liquor taxes excluded a citizen from our best
society and I see no reason why it should banish an alien from our
worst. ' 210 Or, concurring in a case which rejected an opinion on the im-

migration laws which, as Attorney General, Jackson had signed, and
which he now regretted: "If there are other ways of gracefully and goodnaturedly surrendering former views to a better considered position, I invoke them all."'2Y Or, in decrying excess publicity about a criminal case:
"The case presents one of the best examples of one of the worst menaces to
American justice. '' 212 Or, decrying the comparative results of the Joint

Anti-Fascist case and Bailey v. Richardson in which, as he saw it, an organization was getting rights of due process but the individual government employee was not: "So far as I recall, this is the first time this Court
has held rights of individuals subordinate and inferior to those of or27 Screws v. United States, 325
25S

U.S. 91 (x945).
The conclusion is: "It is easy to mock or minimize the significance of 'free trade among

the states,'. . . which is the significance given to the Commerce Clause by a century and a
half of adjudication in this Court. With all doubts as to what lessons history teaches, few

seem clearer than the beneficial consequences which have flowed from this conception of the
Commerce Clause." Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comw'n,
341 U.S. 329, 340 (i95i). Justice Douglas has disagreed with Justice Frankfurter on almost
every one of the "adjudications of this Court" on that subject for the last eleven years.
2s9American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 34r U.S. 6, 17 (Reed), 21 (Douglas) (igi).
2"o Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 241 (i95i).
6
2 ' McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. x62, 178 (1go).
2 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 5o, 55 (1951).
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ganized groups. I think that is an inverted view of the law-it is justice
'' 6
turned bottom-side up. 2 3
In terms of results at least, Jackson's views were, with great frequency,
the views of the Court. But this is limited to concurrence in result, for he
frequently was in distinctive concurrence, rather than joining the main
opinion. The best description of the relationship is that in 195o-51, Justice
Jackson and the balance of the majority were walking side by side.
Justice Jackson this year took the most extreme anti-free speech views
held by any Justice in at least two decades. His lone dissent in Kunz v.
New York,26 4 though most ingenious, is a fundamental attack on the right
to speak offensive dogmas, and, as has been more fully developed above,
his lone position in the Dennis case would reduce the First Amendment to
negligible scope except in those rare instances in which speech is solely the
product of one man, unrelated to others. The clear and present danger test
was first devised by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,265 a conspiracy case, and more fully developed by Holmes and Brandeis in A brains
v. United States,266 another conspiracy case. Justice Jackson in the Dennis
case seems to be saying that the test is inapplicable-in conspiracy cases.
This, to borrow a phrase, is logic "turned bottom-side up."
At the 195o Term Justice Burton added a new and effective weapon to
his armory, the succinct dissent. From every standpoint, the dissents are a
success. His few paragraphs in Collins v. Hardyman 67 state his point and
his reasons with great clarity, and his opinion in the Los Angeles Loyalty
Oath case26S is the neatest of the five filed. One of the most admirable Burton opinions of prior years had been a lone dissent,29 and while his general
agreement with the Court's majority as presently constituted will preclude his being a frequent dissenter, he may well do some of his best work
when he is in lone position, freed of the necessity both of stating the whole
case and of accomodating to the rest of the majority.
The least graceful Burton opinion of the year is United States v. Yellow
Cab Co.,270 on the question of whether the United States may be impleaded
as a third party defendant by a joint tort-feasor. The result, an affirma263Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 186 (195').
264 340 U.S. 290, 295 (i95I).
26S249 U.S. 47 (x919).

266 250 U.S. 616 (Ygig). This thought is borrowed from my colleague, Professor Donnally,
who is developing it in some detail in a forthcoming article in the Yale Law journal.
267 341 U.S. 65i, 663 (195i).
268 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 7x6, 729 (1951).
269Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 389 (1946).

270340 U.S. 543 (195).
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tive, seems correct and desirable. Note 4, at page 547, sets out the relevant
statute to the extent of half a page. The text, on the very next page, sets
out a large part of the same section over again-another half page. Some
of the most impressive legislative history in support of the conclusion
reached is buried in the middle of footnote 8, which covers a page and a
third of the official reports and begins with a different and less interesting
subject. Note io, to the extent of a third of a page, sets out Rule 14 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, although no point of interpretation of that rule
is raised and its only relevance is its existence. On the other hand, the
opinion very neatly dispatches the government quibble that, even though
it can be sued for contribution, it may not be impleaded in an original case
by a joint tort-feasor because of fancied difficulties arising from the mixture of jury and non-jury issues in the same litigation.
The four main Burton opinions of the year are, to my own taste, distinctly over-conceptual.27I As we said above in discussion of the Spector
Motor case, 272 the opinion goes straight through substance to form. If, as

all concede, the Taft-Hartley Act had to be rewritten in the secondary
boycott cases, there was no reason to draw back at the very point where a
little more rewriting would have made sense. 273 But the merits of con-

ceptual as against functional jurisprudence raise issues aside from the
point here under discussion, for the relative weight to be given in law to
words as against things is in constant dispute. For examples of a particular
kind of jurisprudence, the Spector opinion and the Joint Anti-Fascist
opinion are very fine.
No one can fairly complain that Justice Clark is overly conceptual. As
was developed above, his several opinions on the commerce clause as a
limitation of state power both ask the relevant questions and search in the
facts for the relevant answers with a clarity which that difficult subject
greatly needs. 27 4 No reader will have any difficulty in knowing exactly

what circumstances in the actual life of the community making the regulation and what balancing interest of the nation cause him either to uphold
or to invalidate a law. On the merits, his focus on the presence or absence
of actual discrimination in these cases strikes at the most vital point.
27'Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); NLRB v.
Denver Building & Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (i951), and related cases; Spector Motor
Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1gs); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (195).
"7See p. 182 supra.
27 NLRB v. Denver Building & Trades Council, 34I U.S. 675 (195).
"74 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (ig5i); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil
& Gas Co., 34o U.S. 179 (ig5o); Norton Co. v. Dep't Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 541 (I95I),
dissent; Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 6Io (ig5i).
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Disqualifications in the leading free speech cases do not obscure the fact
that as the new cases come up, Clark will be standing squarely with Vinson and Reed. Where he could participate in such cases, he was with
them 75
The Champlincase,271 with its remarkable conclusion that one definition
clause in a statute means wholly different things for the purposes of different sections, is Clark's most eccentric bit of statutory interpretation for
the year. His opinion in Einick Motors277 is unsatisfactory for the fundamental reason that it does not tell the reader what is decided. The suit was
a treble damage action under the Clayton Act, and one issue was the
weight to be given to a criminal verdict previously obtained against the
same defendant. The Court of Appeals had reversed the trial court. The
concluding sentence of the Supreme Court's misty opinion was: "The
judgments below must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded to
the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. ' 27' But what was the District Court supposed to do? Should it now
enter judgment for plaintiff, as it had originally? Should it give a new
trial, based on the discussion in the Supreme Court opinion, and ignore
what the Court of Appeals had said on other, distinct, points? Mystified
counsel asked for a clarification, and the remand was then changed to a
remand to the Court of Appeals, with instructions "to modify its judgment to conform with this opinion. ' ' 2 79 But if any reader of the reports
wants to know the answer to the simple question-does or does not the
Emich Company win its law suit?-he will not find it in the Supreme
Court reports even as modified.
Good Clark opinions were Elder v. Brannan 8 0 a veterans' preference
problem; the CitiesService Gas case",' (despite an over-leisurely statement
of the facts); the Madison Milk case ;282 and the Spector Motor Co. dissent.283

Justice Minton might deny that wisdom begins where research ends.
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (ig5i); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (195 I )
(Reed opinion, Chief Justice Vinson dissenting on a point unrelated to freedom of speech).
276 United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290 (195I).
277 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (i95').
278 Thelanguage is thus reported at 7x Sup. Ct. advance sheets 408,416. It had been altered
before the official reports appeared.
279 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 945 (195i).
275 Feiner

280

341 U.S. 277 (i95I).

28XCities

Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
28,
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 602, 6io (i95x).
283 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 6so (1951).
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He is captivated by the case in point. An illustration is Ackermann v.
United States.284 Ackermann was an immigrant about to be deported. He
belatedly raised some defenses. Rule 6o(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
permits late defenses to be raised in cases of "(i) ... excusable neglect
...(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The last immigrant, prior to Ackermann, to come to the Supreme
Court with a belated defense was Klapprott, and his lateness was excused.21S In facing Ackerman's case, Justice Minton turned to Klapprott.
The process of distinction began. It was sound, workmanlike, thorough.
Upon seeing it, no reader will doubt that Ackermann's case is not Klapprott's case. That should raise the real question at hand: Does it matter
that Ackermann's case is not Klapprott's case? Is it sound social policy to
treat a deportation order with the rigidity of an ordinary civil judgment?
If one exception should be made for Klapprott, should a new and different
exception be made for Ackermann? But these are not questions for Justice
Minton; Ackermann's case is not Klapprott's case, and therefore let
Ackerman be deported. Q.E.D.B6
The implied criticism goes to the jurisprudence, not to the skill involved. Where close analysis is required, Minton's skill is very great.
These opinions were particularly good: Fogarty v. United States,28 7 on relief to government contractors under the Lucas Act; Moore v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co.,2"5 an FELA case, a model of tort law clarity; and Moser v.
United States, 8 9 holding that a Swiss had not waived his rights to become
an American citizen by applying for a military exemption, an opinion
making neat dispatch of several points. His best opinion of the year is
Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 91 a comprehensive discussion of the factors which the Interstate Commerce Commission must
consider in determining barge rates in relation to rail rates.
214 340 U.S. 193 (195o).
285Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 6oi (z949).

The two cases are contrasted in Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202
(195o), concluding: "From a comparison of the situations shown by the allegations of Klapprott and Ackermann, it is readily apparent that the situations of the parties bore only the
slightest resemblance to each other.... Neither the circumstances of petitioner nor his excuse
for not appealing is so extraordinary as to bring him within Klapproft or Rule 6o(b)(6)."
Justice Black, dissenting for Justices Frankfurter and Douglas concluded: "The result of the Court's illiberal construction of 6o(b) is that these foreign-born people dependent
on our laws for their safety and protection, are denied the right to appeal to the very court
that held (on the Government's admission) that the judgment against their co-defendant was
unsupported by adequate evidence." Ibid., at 205.
287 340 U.S. 8 (1950).
289341 U.S. 41 (i951).
286

28 340

U.S. 573 (1951).

29 340 U.S. 216 (igsi).
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Last year the point was made that Justice Minton sometimes assumed
the point in issue, so stating the question that the real matter in dispute
was never resolved. 91 That mannerism was not evident at all this year. In
the PanhandleEasterncase the issue was whether Michigan could preclude
an interstate natural gas seller from making all its sales to the cream of the
local market, leaving only the less desirable business to a local utility.
It is no surprise to learn that Michigan has this power, so far as the
Natural Gas Act and the Commerce Clause are concerned. Minton speaks
of this as "regulation, not absolute prohibition," and Justice Frankfurter
chides him with a statement that the "problem does not disappear by
invoking a solving phrase. ' 292 The point is not well taken, for Minton had
fully considered the factors that made the Michigan control legitimate.
But just as the great difficulties of a high-policy Court can not be met by
a solving phrase, neither can they always be met by a solving precedent.
CONCLUSION

In the months from October i95o, to January i95i, war was the pre-

occupation of the American people. During that time they engaged in a
small war, and prepared for a large one. In a narrow sense, the issue in
both those wars-against a common enemy-is whether the giant of the
Western Hemisphere or the titan of Eurasia shall rule the world. But this
is indeed a narrow statement of the issue. In a larger sense, the issue is
human freedom, the right of men to pray, to write, and to speak as they
will. Both our power and our freedom have enemies foreign and domestic.
In the year past, every American institution was called upon to lend what
strength it could to the battle on every front. The Justices ofthe Supreme
Court in this year faced almost exclusively the perils to freedom at home.
Each one brought his best to the struggle-his knowledge of American
traditions, his wisdom, his love of the Republic. Were these enough? Did
we lose the skirmishes against the domestic enemies of freedom? Did we,
striking in rage against our domestic enemies, wound ourselves?
291

1949 Term article, 51.

Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329, 336 (Minton
quotation), 339 (Frankfurter quotation) (ig5i).
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APPENDIX
The following list enumerates some of the certioraris denied, and appeals
dismissed, including but not restricted to most of those cases in which some
Justice dissented from the denial. The condensations are taken largely from
Law Week.
A word as to the appeals dismissed. Certiorari is a matter of the Supreme
Court's discretion, while appeal is a matter of right to the party insofar as it
is specifically authorized by Congress; cf. 62 Stat. 928 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1257 (1949). True, the Supreme Court may dismiss an appeal if it is "insubstantial," Zucht v. King, 26o U.S. 174 (1922), and the test of insubstantiality
is extremely subjective. If the Court treats truly arguable questions as "insubstantial," or if it summarily affirms appeals, it has for all practical purposes
obliterated the very difference between certioraris and appeals which Congress
meant to preserve. The Courthas for someyears been in theprocess of interpreting away the difference between appeals and certioraris, reducing the appeals
also to a matter of its own discretion; and it seems probable that within a few
years there will be little practical difference between the two methods of review. Cases No. 114, 293, 488, and 5o4, listed below, illustrate this trend.

The whole subject of certioraris denied is comprehensively reviewed in Harper and Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950
Term, to be published in a forthcoming number of the Pennsylvania Law Review. One may disagree with their recommended solutions without disagreeing
in any way with their conclusion that present experience raises grave doubts
about the value of the Certiorari Act of 1925.
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES

(a) No. 69, Shotkin v. Colorado, 212 P. 2d 1oo7 (Colo., 1949), Black and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is scope of power to punish petitioner for contempt for bringing a suit in violation of order of Colorado Supreme Court.
(b) No. ii, Taylor v. Birmingham, 253 Ala. 369, 45 So. 2d 53, 6o (1950),
Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is whether Senator Taylor was denied
equal protection and freedom of speech by conviction for disorderly conduct
for entering church through door marked "Negro entrance."
(c) No. i49, Ohio ex rel. Greisiger v. Bd. Education, 153 Ohio St. 474,92 N.E.
2d 393 (1950). Issue is whether Jehovah's Witnesses may be barred from using
a public school auditorium used by other denominations for religious purposes,
the basis of exclusion being a ruling by the local school board that the Witnesses
were not a "responsible organization."
(d) No. 225, Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F. 2d 677 (App. D.C., 1950). Issue
is whether fugitive from Georgia prison can raise by habeas corpus in District
231
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of Columbia, from which he is being extradited by Georgia, the allegation that
he was being held interminably without trial and was subjected to cruel and
inhuman treatment in Georgia.
(e) No. 256,RD-DR Corp. .Smith, 183 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 5th, 195o), Douglas,
J. dissenting. The issue is whether the freedom of the press extends to movies,
the Fifth Circuit holding that it did not and that therefore movies could be censored without limit on political grounds. [This, to me, is the most utterly incredible denial of the year.]
(f) No. 372, Shub v. Simpson, 75 A. 2d 842 (Md., 1950). This was no certiorari
denied, but a refusal to expedite hearing. The Chief Justice and Black and
Douglas, JJ., dissented. Since Shub's interest was as the Progressive Party's
candidate for Governor of Maryland in the November, 195o, election, and the
point to be decided was the validity of an oath required of him as a candidate,
the case became moot upon the refusal to advance its hearing to October.
(g) No. '574, Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., v. Felix, 186 F. 2d i (C.A.
3 d, 195o), Black, J., dissenting. Issue is liability of radio station for libel by
candidate for public office using its facilities in view of the non-censorship provisions of the Federal Communications Act.
(h) No. 597, Goo v. United States, 187 F. 2d 62 (C.A. 9th, I951), Black, J.,
dissenting. Issue is whether accused may withdraw plea of guilty before imposition of sentence.
(i) No. 627, Lyon v. Zook (Cal., 1950, unrep.), appeal dismissed, Reed and
Burton, JJ., dissenting. Issue is whether Jehovah's Witnesses were properly
precluded from using school buildings.
(j) No. 643, Pohl v. Acheson (App. D.C., 195I, unrep.), Black and Douglas,
JJ., dissenting. The case involves a number of problems arising from petitions
of habeas corpus by German prisoners of the American military establishment
in Germany.
(k) No. 713, Butler v. Thompson, 184 F. 2d 526 (C.A. 4 th, 1950), appeal dismissed, Douglas, J., dissenting. Issue is whether the poll tax, as administered
in Virginia, discriminates against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, and violates the Act of 1870 re-admitting Virginia to
the Congress.
In addition, the Court denied certiorari in No. 2ol, Sacker v. United States,
182 E. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1950), and No. 300, Hallinanv. United States, 182 F.
2d 88o (C.A. 9 th, 1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in both cases, involving contempt by counsel in the New York Communist case and the California Bridges case.
The foregoing cases are taken from the Appellate Docket. Many of the cases
of alleged denial of due process in criminal proceedings are on the Miscellaneous
Docket. Some of the denials in those cases in which dissents were noted were:
No. 174, Dowdy v. Louisiana,47 So. 2d 496 (La., 195o), Black and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting; No. 3o3, James v. Washington, 221 P. 2d 482 (Wash., 1950), Black,
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Reed, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting; No. 334, Pennsylvania ex rel Johnson v.
Dye (Pa., 1951, unrep.), Douglas, J., dissenting; No. 341, Marelia v. Burke,
336 Pa. 124, 75 A. 2d 593 (1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting; No. 997,
Brown v. NorthCarolina,23 3 N.C. 202,63 S.E. 2d 9 9 (i951), Black and Douglas,
JJ., dissenting.
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS CASES

(a) No. 52, Prudence-Bonds Corp. v. Silbiger, 18o F. 2d 917 (C.A. 2d,
1950), Douglas, J., dissenting. The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that Section 249 of Bankruptcy Act, which prohibits any "committee or attorney" from
trading in securities of corporations in process of reorganization does not
authorize disallowance of fees earned by attorneys whose clients traded in such
securities.
(b) No. 114, Hendricks v. Smith, 153 Ohio St. 500, 92 N.E. 2d 393 (1950),
appeal dismissed, Douglas, J., dissenting. The issue is whether an Ohio property
tax as applied to land leased in perpetuity from the University violates the contract clause in view of an 18o9 Ohio statute exempting university property from
all taxes.
(c) No. 1i, FTC v. Alberty, 182 F. 2d 36 (App. D.C., 1950), FTC required
drug seller of medicine for lassitude due to pernicious anemia resulting from
iron deficiency to make clear that lassitude results less from iron deficiency than
other causes. The Court of Appeals reversed as to this, holding that Commission lacks power to compel advertiser to tell public that his product is
more frequently valueless than it is valuable.
(d) No. 164, Roberts v. Missouri-Kansas-TexasR. Co., 225 S.W. 2d 198
(Tex. Civ. App., 1949), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is whether
FELA case evidence was sufficient to go to jury, in suit by baggage man injured by sand kicked up by motion of train.
(e) No. 232, Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co., 1i8 F. 2d 899 (C.A. 8th,
1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Diversity suit in Missouri federal
court on judgment obtained in Illinois state court. The judgment was secured
on a cognovit note which authorizes any attorney to confess judgment against
obligor. Obligor unsuccessfully contended in Missouri suit that Illinois judgment, obtained with no notice, denies due process and is not entitled to full
faith and credit.
(f) No. 293, Wenning v. Peoples Bank, 153 Ohio St. 583, 92 N.E. 2d 689
(1950), appeal dismissed, Black, Reed, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. A state
mortgage foreclosure proceeding was filed a month before mortgagor filed
farmed-debtor petition in federal district court under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. Thereafter the property was foreclosed by the state court. A variety
of issues as to the validity of the state procedure in the light of Section 75 is
raised.
(g) No. 416, Commissionerv. Swiren, 183 F. 2d 656 (C.A. 7th, i951), seeming
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conflict of circuits on question of whether sale of interest in law partnership
is a capital gain.
(h) No. 427, Healy v. PennsylvaniaR. Co., 1i F. 2d 934 (C.A. 3 d, 195o);
184 F. 2d 209 (C.A. 3 d, 1950), Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is
whether in FELA case there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on question
of proximate cause, the precise point involving the relation of the failure to blow
a whistle and the death of the employee.
(i) No. 451, 2, Koons v. Kaiser,Koons v. Kaufman, 187 F. 2d 1023 (C.A. 2d,
1950), one of several cases which has raised the puzzling question of how and
where, if at all, transfers of cases from one district to another under the new
transfer provisions of the judicial code are to be reviewed.
(j) No. 488, Kemp v. South Dakota, 44 N.W. 2d 214 (S.D., I95O), appeal dismissed, Douglas, J., dissenting. The issue is whether a South Dakota statute
precluding certain hunting licenses for nonresidents violates certain treaties
and the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, Section 2.
(k) No. 504, Rosecrans v. West Edmond Salt Water Ass'n,
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(Okla., 1950), appeal dismissed, Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is
whether order of state commission permitting injection of salt water into defendant's well is a denial of due process as to plaintiff, under whose land the
salt water will percolate, where the percolation will come into a stratum of land
on which plaintiff already has salt water.
(1) No. 528, Moffett v. ArabianAmer. Oil Co., x84 F. 2d 859 (C.A. 2d, 1950),
Black, J., dissenting. Plaintiff allegedly performed services under contract with
defendant, whereby the United States government made certain requirements of
British government which were of benefit to the defendant. The jury found that
the plaintiff had, by his services, procured the desired result, but the District
Court dismissed for want of evidence and on public policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the evidence point, and Black's dissent is probably on the
question of the relative responsibilities of judge and jury on the question of
fact.
(in) No. 532, Ottley v. St. Louis-San F. -Ry.Co., 232 S.W. 2d 966 (Mo., 1950),
Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. This is an FELA case in which a jury verdict
was set aside, and the issue is the extent of the power to set aside jury verdicts
in these cases.
(n) No. 56i, Williams v. Hughes Tool Co., i86 F. 2d 278 (C.A. ioth, 1950).
The larger issue is whether plaintiff was using patents on rotary drilling bits,
combined with a leasing system and a multiplicity of law suits, to prevent the
sharpening of dulled tools and to restrain trade in resharpening.
(o) No. 798, Dority v. New Mexico ex rel Bliss, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P. 2d 1007
(1950), appeal dismissed, Reed and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. Issue is validity
of New Mexico statute making subsurface waters public property, statute
challenged on ground it denies due process and takes property without just
compensation.
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THE DOLLAR MIX-UP

Seldom, if ever, has certiorari procedure looked worse as an instrument of
justice than in Land v. Dollar. In 1945, the Dollar steamship interests brought
suit in the District of Columbia against the Maritime Commissioners to recover the stock of the Company. On the eventual outcome of the litigation
depends the question of who owns this large line. The nature of the substantive
dispute is immaterial here except to note that the matter is highly arguable.
The Supreme Court, 330 U.S. 731 (1947) held that the suit was not against the
United States but against the Commissioners in their individual capacities, and
therefore did not infringe upon sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals in
due course gave judgment on the substantive issues for the Dollars. At the
195o Term, in case No. 353, the Court denied certiorari, 340 U.S. 884, Black and
Clark, JJ., not participating in this or the later stages of the matter. Later in
the term the Court denied a petition for rehearing, 340 U.S. 948, and also
denied certiorari in the related case No. 552.
The normal grounds for granting certiorari are (a) public importance of the
issue, or (b) conflict of decision. By its denial of certiorari, the Court necessarily
implied either that the question of whether the government or the Dollars own
the steamship company is not of importance, or that the legal issues involved
were not of importance. The Government, veryproperly bewildered by that somewhat remarkable conclusion, thereupon set out to achieve a conflict. The earlier
Supreme Court opinion cited above had held that the United States was not a
party to the litigation, but that only the Commissioners were involved. The
Government thereupon instituted a new suit in a federal District Court in California in the name of the United States against the Dollars to preclude relinquishing the stock and thereby giving up the interests of the United States
in that stock to the Dollars. The Government secured a temporary injunction
in that California suit. This is the most absurd kind of legal fiction, since it
assumes a difference between the interests of the United States and the Commissioners; but the certiorari system as thus administered requires this ingenuity.
Meanwhile the Court of Appeals was becoming outraged at the failure of the
Commissioners to turn over the stock to the Dollars. With a great fanfare of
publicity, it threatened the Secretary of Commerce, successor to the Maritime
Commission, and other public officials with contempt. At the end of Term
what had originally been merely case No. 353 was back with the Court again,
on motion to reconsider the denial of the petition for rehearing of the original
refusal to grant the writ. Along with it came Nos. 697 and 702, which were respectively petitions to review an order requiring the Secretary of Commerce
to endorse over the stock, and a temporary restraining order of the Court of
Appeals enjoining the parties from proceeding in the suit instituted in California,
and enjoining them from paying any attention to the California temporary
injunction.

236

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

Chief Justice Vinson issued a stay, and finally, on the last day of the term,
341 U.S. 912 (i95I), the Court granted the petitions in Nos. 697 and 702, and
continued the motion to reconsider the denial of No. 353 until the next term
of Court. But this left the matter in chaos over the summer, and Justice Jackson, dissenting alone on this point, thought that the Court should stay in session
to get the business settled once and for all.
To sum up the consequences of the original denial of No. 353, because the
Court felt that the ownership of this line did not raise questions worthy of being
decided by it, the time of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and
its District Court, and of the California federal District Court and, eventually,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, are extensively occupied. The
Secretary of Commerce, the Undersecretary of Commerce, the Solicitor General,
the Deputy Attorney General, and a number of other federal officials have
been brought into most unseemly conflict with the courts of the District of
Columbia, and the newspapers have been filled with speculations as to whether
those officers would go to jail for contempt. The time of countless attorneys,
with great expense to all concerned and serious loss of efficiency for the government agencies whose staffs have been involved in the litigation, has been extensively used, if not wasted. The "return" of the Government on the contempt citation of the Court of Appeals, for example, is a document weighing
over a pound. The question of title to the line is left in doubt for at least an
additional year.
And the Supreme Court will now have to deal with the situation anyway.
Is it possible even to conceive of a reason why it would not have been better
practice to have granted certiorari to No. 353 in the first place?

